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l. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has periodically experimented with legalizedgamhling 
activities. In each historical "wave," the social costs related to gambling 
became both apparent and overwhelming. consistently leading to the 
criminalization of all gambling activities. I Historically. policymakers 
rediscovered that the social costs of gambling were enonnous. and experts 
concluded that applying those costs "to the adult population of the United 
States [in 1994) implie[dJ losses equal to ... an additional Hurricane Andrew, 
the most costly disaster in American history, ellery year.,,2 Yet legalized 
gambling had no significant social or economic benefits. as it "involves simply 
sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals. creating no new 
money or goods, Although it creates no output. gambling does nevertheless 
absorb time and resources, When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, ' , , 
gambling subtracts from the national income,") 
In addition to these enonnous social costs, gambling in the United Stales 
remained extremely difficult, if not impossible. to regulate effectively, This 
situation was essentially due to two factors, First. the regulatory scheme in 
" 
"" 
I. 
2. 
l 
Due to rapidly developio& issues, current periodicals were necessarily utiliud. This a~a1ysis 
anemptcd to 1'ilUl" 001 publitalions wbkh were 100 influenced by lIIe gambling industry 
Prorwor, Univ. Dl. al Ufblna·Olampaip. A.B .. COU. WIUiam and Mary; 1.0 ., MBA, Univ Ga., 
1l..M" SJO, Univ. Va.; A$SOC:iate, P'rocam i~ Arms ConuoI, Disarmament, and International 
Security, Univ. m. Tom Asmv.1Id Slepben W. Joy provi(\('d valuable assiSlance in ediling alld cile-
clK:ckingtlli! analrsis . 
Set gtntrally CHARLESCLOTFFJ.TF.R &: PHlWPCOOK. SEWNG HOPE( 1989). Set /l/so John Warren 
Kim!1, Tht Et:OlWmlr InI{XlC/S fJ/ /.,egoli~w Gllrnblilll M li>'ilirs, 43 DRAKE l.. REV. 51, S9 (1994) 
(hefeiMftt;r &""flmli: Im,D<lCUJ. 
Earl L. Griools, GambUnl IU £CoMmic Policy: En"mt,a,in, Why LoS$t1 Excttd Gains, lu.. Bus. 
R£v" Spring 1995. 1 (emphasis added) [hereinafter £C(l()()tfri€' Lonu Excttd (;Dins) . 
PAULA.SAMlJE1.SON, EcoNoM1CS425 (10th cd. 1916) (SiIl'rIuclsoll won tbc: NDbel Pnze in Ecooomic 
Science ill 1970): 1ft' Jolm Wanen Killdl, U.s. NalWIIDI S«t4riry and Iht' Sfralt'lic Ecnnflmk BlUr: 
Th~ Businf'Is1EcOllflmic Impact! o/rht u6aliultion a/GaRlbli<lg A.clivililS,)9 ST. l..oUIs U. LJ. 567 
(1995). Su 0&0 ECOfJINI1ic Lonts Exc"d (jain.r, lupra nOte 2, al6, g ("Gambling beyood tbc poin1 
of recreation Of entertainmen1 fedllCes national income,"). 
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place in many Slates provided a larger incentive for gambling operators to skirt 
the law than 10 comply with it. As legalized organ ized gambl ing spread 
throughout the United States during the 1990's, gambling operdlors often 
prefe rred to pay a fine when caug ht violating regulations rather than simply 
complying with them on a regular basis.· Second. the gambling indusuy 
fonned jXIwerful lobbies as soon as it was established in a given state, making 
large political contributions and compromising any sign ificant opposition. ' 
These efforts created a climate of corrupt decision-making that influenced 
legislators to weaken the regulatory scheme then in place and to refuse to 
address gambling issues in a manner consistent with the public intercst ' Each 
of these factors was driven by the large. almost unlimited supply of cash 
generated by gambling operations and available to finance the interests of the 
gambling industry. As long as these factors remained unchanged. effective 
regulation of the gambling industry was a practical failure . Economic history 
has demonstrated that legalized gambling activities corrupted government 
decision-making and destabilized the strategic economic base. 
The basic McDougal/Lasswell approach to government policy-making 
utilized in this analysis was focused on U.S. regulatory effort s. but the issues 
and conclusions also reflect the problems in other countries and can be 
extrapolated to those countries. particularly to developing countries lacking 
even rudimentary regulations. Utilizing the meta-language model of po licy-
oriemed jurisprudence confirmed this analysis and conclusion,' 
4. Su discussion of fines, III/ro Part IV. 
5. Su gt~'ally BETTEJI. Gov'T ASS·N, STAFF WHITE PAPEJt : CASI.'<O CAMBIJNG IN Q~CAOO 95-101 
( 1992) [here:inaf"kr B(jA REPoRT]. "A regulation [was] SII'OfII onlyifil (was] enfOllXd. Our resurdl 
Lndicate/d] that the cash flow involved in !be casino busiflC$S, as well as the TULlllre of !be business 
iudf. etlCCIUn&e[d] conuption ~nd undermine{d] the most well·inltntioncd regulations:· rd. II 101. 
6. ~t gtntrolly ''The BacklaslL Against the Gambling Industry and AS50Ciatcd Governmenl Officials,·' 
in,frg Part V.A. 
7. This particular article is summary in scope, bUI il foUoWJ the McDougallUssweU model fordccision-
making. ID the areas of leaal and &Qvemment policy, which subsume slrIte,ic JOClo-«onomJC and 
business concerns, the clasSIC deci~ ion'miLkin, models were fc:nnulatcd by the post legal realists. 
parucula.rly Professor Myres McDougal and Professor Harold Lasswell. w~o postulated a conceptual 
ftllmewort for Ie,al decision-making in a landmark article d1TCCted lOWardle,al cducaton and law 
professon. Harold O. I...asswcU & Myres S. McDoupl, u,aI EducatiOfl and Publk Polley 
Proftssional Traillin, in tilt Publu: fnrrrtlf, 52 YALE LJ 203 (l943); stt also Harold D. Lasswell 
&: Myres S. McDoupl. Criltriafora ThtoryaOOuIl.<Jw, 44 S. CALlJ' L REV. 362 (1971); M)TCS S 
McDougal , Ju,ispnuk"rt fo r II Fr" Socitry. I GA. L. REV. I ( 1966), John WlITen KlOdL AI1 
AlIa/p IS OJ u,al fliurolitM A.M' BILJUlt$.S EdMCIII;OI1 Witltifl TM COIIltAl OJ A. J DAIBA Pro,rom , 
31 J. I..E.GAL Eouc. S 12, SJ7-18 ( 1981); John WI/Tell Kindt. All AfIlllySls Of uraJ EtiW'IJtjOtl And 
8/U1Iws Edur.orion. Witltifl 1M COtItUI OJ A J.D.lMBA. Pro8,Dmmit, \3 LAw TEAcHER 12, 14-16 
(1979). "The decision·making conccpt.S wllich McDougal and I..a.sswel1 inuoduced were later ell panded 
to include international La .... and U.S . domestic law, as theK areas inlelfaccd .. i th "pohcy-ori~1ed 
jwisprudcocc." S« John N. Moore, PTIJk,OnttIlOfl (Q du J"risplUdtnct rif Myrts McDotqal and 
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II. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS: STRATEGIC NA TIONA!. 
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH GAMBLING 
A. Addictions 
In 1995. Associate Professor Howard Shaffer of the Division on 
Addictions at Harvard Medical School concluded that "[g]ambling is an 
addict ive behavior, make no mistake about it . .. Gambling has all the 
properties of a psychoact ive substance, and ... changes the neurochemistry of 
the brain."a When legalized organ ized gambling activities become socially 
acceptable and publicly accessib le, state governments begin creating new 
populations of pathological (add icted) gamblers. As early as 1980, the 
addictive nature of gambling was officially recognized by the American 
Psychiatric Association ("APA,,).9 Before widespread legalized gambling 
ex isted in the United States, there was a naturally occurring base rate or 0.77 
percent of the U.S. adult population that constituted pathological gamblers, as 
detenn ined by the 1976 U.S. Commission on the Review of the National 
Policy Toward Gambling. lo The percentage of adult pathologicaJ gamblers 
then rose to between 1.5 and 5 percent as gambling was legalized in the 1980's 
and 1990's. II According to the Harvard Division on Addictions, for example. 
1.5 million people, or 0.5 percent of the U.S. population, became new 
pathological gamblers in the 3-yearperiod from 1994 to 1997,12 which resulted 
HlJrold Lrus>W'II. 54 VA L REV. 662 (I968). Frederick S. Tipsoa. Note. Tht Lnswtll-McDougal 
Enterpnst. Too.lord 0 World Publk Orrk~ oJHumall Digllify. 14 VA. J. OO'L L. 535 (1914). 
g Ford TUllia, Ntunx-hf'micals Blamf'djo~ Compulsiw: Gamblillg. g COMt'Ul..SlVCGAMBUNG, Winter 
1995~96. at I (citing article in the BEACON-NEWS (Spnnifiel4. Mass .), May 10. 1995). 
9 SU AM. PSYCHIATtUC ASSOC .• DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF ME/l.TAL D ISORDERS. § 
3 12.3 1 (4th td. 1994) (~pathoiOilical pmbling" ) (herdn.after OSM-IV] (Iechnically. patholOi!eal 
gambling was catcg(wi1.ed as an impulse ~onuol disorder). 
10. U.S. COMM' N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT'L PoL'y TOWARD GAMBLING. GAMBLING IN AMERICA 73 
(U.s. Gov't mntina Off. 1976). 
II. Suo t .g., uOtliJ,,,k Lossu Excud Gains. sllp~a nOI( 2. al 6 : ALTA. loTTERIES AND GAMING. 
GAMBL!NG "'''0 i'R0IIL£"'I GAMBLING!N ALBERTA. at 18 ( 1994). 
12. The calcuJaoOl'l of 05 percent of the U-S. population or 15 million new p,athological (~dicted) 
i:amblers created by k-phud pmbling hetwetn 1994 and 1997 UITlt from the Oi\,. on AddicbOO$, 
Harvard Medical School. £.rllrrUllu'g Iht Pr"wUf'tICf' ojDi.rorduf'd Gwnblillg BdUlvi()T in tilt U"ittd 
Statts and CaNJt!a' " Mtta-analysi.r, at 43, Table 13 &:: 5 1. Table 16 (Ho~-ard J. Shafftr. Manbew 
N. HaJJ, &Joni Vand(t Bill . Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinancr Harvard AddIctions Mel2-analysis];Ju Press 
Release or Harvard Mediul Sch .• " Harvard Medical S~hool Res(aIcben Map Prevaleacc of 
Gambling Disorders in NOIth Amt:rica,~ Dc~. 4. 1997 (From .84 percent, "tbe prevalence rale!for 
pathological gambling) for 1994-1 ~7 gn:w to 1.29 percent of !he Iidult population."'). 
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in new costs to me U.S. taxpayers of up to S4S billion per year. n An 
additional 2 percent, or 3.5 million more people. became new problem 
gamblers during that same three-year period, I. 
Maintaining me same level of quality of life after gambling was legalized 
in any given venue was calculated to require a 100 percent to 550 percent 
increase to social -welfare budgets, most likely generated by a sharp increase 
in taxes. J' These costs did not include the costs of rehabilitating any 
pathological gamblers, which constituted an additional $17,000 to S42,OOO per 
gambler. 16 
Recognizing that 27 (0 55 percent of casino revenues came from 
pathological and problem gamblers,l7 concerns were raised during the 1990's 
about appeals to this market segment. II Like any other industry, elements of 
the gambling industry apparently pursued the most lucrative customer 
segment--lhe pathologically addicted gambler: 
By purchasing lists from credit-card companies, the casinos know whal you 
buy. and then they can track census data to approximate your home value and 
income. Then there are the direct-mall lists. One such list from the early 
1990s was baldly called the "Compulsive [i.e., Pathological) Gamblers 
Special" and promised to deliver 200,000 names of people with 
"unquenchable appetites for all forms of gambling." Another list features 
"some 250,000 hatd-rore gamblers."J' 
Other techniques included tracking gamblers by "frequent-gambler card[s]" 
inserted into electronic gambling devices. as well as credit cards mat earned 
points toward casino promotions.· 
13. Suo ~I" Stalemtnt of John Wuten Kindt, Uniw. Ul., 10 !he National Gamblin, Impact Study 
Commission, MU.S. and Inr.emational Concerns over the Socio-Eronomic Costs of Legalittd 
Gamblin • . Greater Than !he Dkpl Drv, Problr;m~," ChiClIO. nt , Mar2 t, 1998, IlIereiaafter -U.S. 
and International Costs"l at Table I. Su aJJo JoI'In WllTen Kindt n.~ Crurs 0/ Addir./ro Gamblus: 
SJ,(N;ld Ih~ SltJltS Initialt M~ga-UJwsui/j Similar 10 tM Tabarro Cas~J1, 22 M ... N ... GERI,tJ. ,o.Nl) 
DECISION EcoH. 17 (2001) (llercinafter M~Ia·UJwsJ<ilJJ. 
14. 1Iar-'w AlidictiooJ Meta-analysis, supra noce 12,1143, Tahir; 13 .t..5 I, Table 16. 
1.5 . £cOI'Iomic Impacrs, supra IIOl£ 1.116.5. 
16. ~~ Itll"ally Economic impacts. SNpfQ note 1. 
17 Suo t .I. "Mcuunna!be Costs of Pa~ Gambli",," Addfcss by Prof. Henry R. Les icIII'.llI . 
SI. Uniw .. II the Nat'l COlI!. 011 GamblJII, BebaWlOl', NII'1 Cowl. 011 Problem Gamblia" <:bjcqo. 
01 .• Sept. 3-.5. 1996. 
18 ~t John Warren Kindt, FolIo><' Ih~ MOfI~'; GwrIbIu.,. £Iltiel. "lid S"bpotNlJ, SS6 ANS..u..5 AM 
ACADEMY Pa.. &-Soc.. $a., 85, 91 (1998) (bcnio.aAer Follaw Iitt Montyj 
19 S. C. QwraDe, How C.w.os HOD! Yo ... : 1M GombIlII8lndtulry is Cnotu., Hlllt·TKIt DaJabGsu 
10 Nul u. CamptlWw PID,.,n, TlME. Nov. 17, 1997.1168.69. 
20 Id . .116&-69. 
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B. Bankruptcies 
If the demographics of prior studies were paralleled, the 1.5 million new 
pathological gamblers created from 1994 to 1997 could have easily resuhed 
in 315.000 new bankruptcy filings.21 A bankruptcy study focusing on 1997 by 
the WEFA Group, a consultaO[ group often used by the gambl ing industry. 
found that 70 percent of all bankruptcy filings in that year were Chapter 7 
filings,n The adjusted weighted average debt per filer was $74.650.2l The 
average legal cost was $505.2-4 Furthermore, the average court cost was $418.23 
Thus, WEFA calculated the total average cost at $75.573 per Chapter 7 fili ng. 
Applying this result to bankruptcy filings by new pathological gamblers 
implied a total cost of ovec $16.66 billion for Chapter 7 fil ers over the 3-year 
period. 26 For the 30 percent that were Chapter 13 filings, WEFA found an 
adjusted. weighted average debt per filer of $137,272,27 an average legal cost 
of $1000,11 and an average court cost of $837.19 Thus, the total average cost 
was $139,109 per Chapter 13 filer. Applying thi s result to bankruptcy filings 
by new pathological gamblers corresponded. to a total cost of 5 13.15 bill ion for 
Chapter 13 filings over the three-year period.XI Thus, the total costto society 
of personal bankruptcies by new pathological gamblers over me 3-year period 
was an astounding $29.81 billion.)' Ho lding the number and propol1ion of 
fil ings constant and adjusting to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") 
21 SMR RESEAI.CH CORP., lliE PERSONAL BANKRlJP'I'CY CJusts . 1997. 123-24 (1997) (herein.lfter 
BANKRlIl'TCY CRISts). 
22. WEFA GROUP. THE ASANCW... COSTS OF PERSONAL OANKRlJP'TC!E$, at I (Feb. 1998) {htreiNlI'Ia 
WErA 1998]. 
23. 'd. at II. 
24. 'd. at I'. 
25. 'd. 
26. If thc conservativt ~tirmte of 31'.000 new bankruplcies attributed to new patholoaical ,unblen 
parallcled thc 70 perCeIl l eak:ulation for Chap«:r 1 filers as WEPA implied. then at an aver.ll,c COS I 
of $7','37 each. the total Chapter 7 bankruptCy cost of patholoiical pmblers was $16.66 billion. 
21. WEPAI998.slIpronote22, atll . 
28. Id. at I'. 
29. Id. 
30. If ~ COOSCfYllti¥C estimate of 315.000 new bankroptcies attributed to new pa thological gunblers 
paralleled !be 30 ~rttnt calculation for Chapter 13 filers as WEFA implied. then at an averag.: cost 
of $ 139, 109 each, the total Chapter J3 hankruptcy emt or pathologic.al gamblers was sn.ls billion 
31 Sf't aUo BANKRUPTCY CRISIS. slI.pra note 21, al 123-24 (fintling !hat the tot.aJ cost to society of 
personal bankruptcies by new patbologieal gamblers over lhe 3-year perioci was II least $9 billion); 
Mt~·Wwswls, S"Pro !IOU; 13, It 4S, Table A4; "U.S. anti International Cosu." supra note 13, al 
Table 4 and aceompillying foomOlQ (finding a range of Sl 2 billion 10 $36 billion in banbuptcy eosu 
due to ~thololieal pmblen). 
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prices for 2(HX),ll this cost figure grew to approximately $31.98 billion. or 
S1O.66 billion per year. 
Applying the same type of calculations to the 90,000 bankruptcy filingsll 
by the 3.5 million new problem gamblers over that same 3·year period 
revealed that the total Chapler 7 costs were $4.76 billion and the total Chapter 
13 costs were $3.76 billion. These personal bankruptcies of new problem 
gamblers totaled approximately $8.52 billion in costs to society over the 3-year 
period.)4 Holding the number and proportion of filings constant and adjusting 
to year 2000 BLS prices. this figure grew to about S9.14 billion. 
While some economists might have argued that the debts per filer should 
not be included in these calculations because they represented a transfer of 
wealth from the gambler-debtor to the gambling industry. these debts still 
cons tituted losses to the primary financial institutions in volved with 
concomitant transactional. administrative. and even policy costs. By 
comparison. sociologists definitely include the debts per filer as "abused" 
nonproductive costs. U 
C. Crime 
According to a gambling industry funded study,l6 legalized gambling 
caused 1.5 million people, or 0.5 percent of the U.S. population. to become 
new criminals in the three years from 1994 to 1997, at a U.S. cost of $12 
billion to $15 billion.]1 Adjusting these figures to year 2000 BLS prices,lI rne 
32. Numbr:rs an adjuStM IO)'UI" 2000doLlan llSin& tile Consumer Price Index for AU Urban Consumm. 
published by the U.S. Bureau ofu.bor Statistics. 0.1 ftp .llhpbls.govlpublspccLaI.requestslcpiJcpiai. tJ:1 
(last modified Mat. 21 , 2001); see geMrally http://s t.lls.bls.gov/cpibomc.hlm. TIle formula fer 
cakulltinl the)'Ul" 2000 numbers is: $ Prior yur x (CPI2OOQICPI Prior)U1)" 5 Year 2000 
11. BANKRUYTCY CltLS1S, supra note 2 1, at 123--24. 
34. Id. (fiD.(t inl !bat the toW cost to society ofpcrsooal banknlptCics by new problem gamblers o~er the 
3-year period. was at leut 53 billion); Mtga-w...swilS, slqIra DOle 13, I I 4!1. Table A.5; "U.S. and 
IDttmatiooal Costs, ~ swpra DOCC Il. It Table !land accompiIIyiDg fOOlDOleS {(lI\(ting a range of S3 
billion 10 $14 billion in bankruptey costs due to problem gamblers). 
)!I. For I summary of COSI 51udiC$, Ut "U.S. and InttmalloDll Costs:' swpra nott 13. at Tables)""8 and 
aa:ompuyina footnolt$. Costs can be adJusltd IO)'CV 2()()() doIIan uslIlglbe procedure I1JJcUJsed 
in footDOlC )2, swpra. Sa also Mtga -l4wSllits, sMpra note 13. al 44-41. Tabln A)....A8 
)6. "U.S. and Inlernational Costs," '''PTa DOlt 13, at Table 10 llOIe I. r'Criucs of the [Harvard 
Addictioruj (Mleta-anaI)'Sis [swp.-a DOlt 121 nou:d !batthe anai)'Sis wuc:nli~ ly runded by I $140,000 
&J2-Il1 from the pmbI.in& iod.uslr)' . . . , . 
)1. Harvard Addicfioos Meta-analysis, IwptlI DOlt 12. at 4) , Table Il & 51, Tab~ 16. ~U.S. and. 
intmt.ltional Casu," sUPI"Q. note 13, al Tables 1,7. an(t accompanying fOOIlIOIes. Su aha M~ga­
Lawrwi ts, IWPI"Q. now: 13, al44. 46, Tables AI. A1. )a. Stt sllPra IIOIt; 32 and acxorDJWI)'io&IC:J.L 
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costs became S12.9 billion to $16.1 billion. However, the total cost of 
criminal activities undenaken to support gambling habits was significantly 
higher; sociologists and psychologists uniformly reponed that "[v]irtually aU 
pathological gamblers commit crimes:>3'1 although many of these gamblers 
were not prosecuted because their victims often included '"fami ly members or 
close associates.'~ During the 1980s and 19905. experts and studies reported 
that "between 12.5 percent and J 5 percent of all pathological gamblers would 
become incarcerated: .. 1 When multiplied by the 1.5 million new criminals 
admitted in the Harvard Meta-analysis,'2 this corresponded to 187.500 to 
225,000 jailed pathological gamblers over the three-year period, or an average 
of 62,500 to 75,000 pathological gamblers incarcerated each year. 
Interestingly, although these numbers were reported to the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission ("NOISC") on May 21, 1998, the NGISC Final 
Report issued in 1999 suggested even more dramatic numbers.·) Specifically, 
the NGISC Final Report stated: "A third of problem and pathological gamblers 
had been arrested, compared to 10 percent of low·risk gamblers and 4 percent 
of non-gamblers. About 23 percent of palhologicaJ gamblers have been 
imprisoned, and so had J 3 percent of problem gambLers. "oW 
This assessment approximately doubled the earlier numbers reported by 
many experts in the 1980's and 1990's, as well as the 1998 summary 
calculations.·' 
III. CLARlFlCATION OF GOALS 
A. The Unacknowledged Public Interest and Regulatory Need 
Throughout the latter years of the 20th century, the gambling indusuy tried 
to reclassify itself as one of several categories in the entertainment industry. 
However, to become a bona fide entertainment venue from an economic 
perspective, the gambling industry needed to conduct its business without 
creating new addicted gamblers and the bankruptcies and erime that 
39. Su, 1:.1:., "u.s and InlerUiluonal C05\S," supra IlQI£ Il. at 9. Table 8 nOtl:$ 3-5. 
4D. fd. al9. 
41. fd; MrtQ,w"'JwilS, Jwpra note \3.1147, Table AS noteS 4-9 
42. Su supra noteS 36-37 and accompanying leU 
43. NAT'l G AM8UNG l.'o(J'Acr STUDY CoMM'N. FINAL REPORT cb 7, 14 (June 1999). nvailablr ar 
bttp:lI ................ npr.eov/ngisclreporullinrpl.html [hereinafler NGISe fINAL. REPORT). 
44. {d. 
45 . Su, '.11., "U.S. and Inl£maoonal Costs." supm nOl:e 13, at Table 8 a~d accompanying fOOUlOtes . 
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accompanied them.46 Furthennore. to constitute entertainment in the economic 
sense, legalized organized gambling would have to be so structured. that there 
could be no net loss in national income • a theoretical and practical 
impossibility.fl Gambling was also miscategorized as entertainment from a 
socielal perspective, as the industry has sougbt disproportionate advantage in 
distinct regulatory systems of individual states, and by making excessive 
contributions to legislators:" Therefore, federal and state governments needed 
to pursue distinct regulatory goals in order to prevent the gambling industry 
from draining the economies of the United States and degrading the social 
fabric of the regions in which it operates. 
If licensed organized gambling could have been contained as a form of 
entertainment only and not pennitted to the point of addiction, theoretically it 
would not have resulted in a significant increase in social costs. However. 
because social costs were inherent in any gambling activities. the public 
interest in containing social costs required a regulatory system in which 
licensed organized gambling activities. such as casinos. faced large penalties 
and other disincentives so they would nOl pursue those actions which created 
the multibillion dollar social COSlS.·9 From a historical perspective, this 
system's starting point required the gambler's physical presence to gamble. 
If gambling constituted entertainment and nothing more. this requirement was 
not burdensome. The system also supported a universal ban on internet 
gamb ling, which was impossible to regulate by virtue of its widespread 
accessibility. During the late 1990's, internet gambling proponents argued 
that, as a practical mauer, gambling could not be banned on the internet 
because of its technological Ubiquity. Where the government did not have the 
practical power to "ban" some activity. however, it certainly could not 
46. Stt ,f"fraity dlscuuion in "Delimitation of Pl'oblcms," supra Part n. 
47. Stt 5AMlIEL$ON, supra note 3 ("When pursued be)'Olld the limits or recrealion. . . pmblinlt 
5ubtncts from the oatiooal income "). 
48. Srf ,,"traUy discussioo ifl"Compromisio& the Oppositiorl," Ut/ra Pan V.A) $u DIIO Dan Montio 
&. TomGorrtwl. u,islaluff Qukkly OKs Gamin, SJt.ip UuiJIos: 8i11 MDNa Ttl/fo, Go~ Dam 
by ExpanJin, IndUm Ga",blill, /n C,..isu in Inlf'rNJIiona/ W/lftrl. L.A. TIMES. Mar. 17.2000, at A) 
[hereinafter U,islIItll~ QllicHy OK~ Casino1) (~'The Indians bave bou&hl Sacramento,' S.J.id 
Assemblyman Bruce TlIonw .... 'They CIII ba-.e wbate-.er they waol.'~); KENT REDFIELD, 
STACKING THE DECK: THE FI..oW OF MONSY FIIOM GAMIIUN(l INTEIl£STS INTO ILuNOIS POLITICS 8 
(1999) [bereinaftcr STACKING THE DECK] ('"The more thaD S 1.6 million in campaip CXlntriblltions 
[in UIiDOis] from pmbIiog iOlC:re51[s) in 1995196 placed prnbliDJ: abeId orreal C$1a~, illSlIBDCC,.and 
public utilities .. •. [tIn a vay sban time, pmblinc intemlS have become. sianifiClnI COIIblbutor 
10 state·level public offICials IIId C2Ddidues La WUIOIS. ;. 
49. For UI O\'efVlew oftbe C05ts oflepJized pmblina. su ,tMnlily '1>cluruta\lOll ofProblems,M IlIpTII 
Pan II. 
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"regulate" that activity effective ly. Furthermore, bans were more easily 
enforced. 
Proper regulation required fair and regular enforcement. With regard 10 
licensed casinos, for example, regulators during the 1990's needed to demand 
and obta in compliance with the federal and state laws and regulations 10 which 
the casinos agreed when they established rhemseives.jI) In order to achieve 
practical compliance, regulators needed to increase the amounts or fines by 
factors of five or len , and then to check regularly for violations. Furthermore. 
regulatory authorities needed {O be prepared to revoke licenses for non-
compliance. Also, in order to maintain the existing degree of oversight. 
regulators had to fight the deteriorating influences of political contributionsS1 
and corruption.n Once states began authorizing various forms of regulated 
gambling. it quickly became difficult for them to act with sufficient 
uniformity. enabling the industry to use the false allure of comparative 
economic advantage to woo states.53 Social costs were easily overlooked in 
such contcsts. 
To contain the social costs of gambling. a strictly-enforced loss limit was 
necessary to control the (olal amount wagered per gambling session as well as 
the amount wagered per round-a function of the speed of the gambling. For 
example. losses could be tracked by casinos and limited to $500 per visit per 
day, and some smaller amount per wager or per round of gambling. Loss limit 
laws provided a good place to start, but they had to be rigidly enforced. 
Enforcing loss limits was generally a difficult task. since both casi nos and 
pathological and problem gamb lers had incentives to ignore the loss limitS-/. 
Thus , strong disincentives to thwart the loss limits needed to be in place in the 
Conn of heavy fines and frequent enforcement. 
B. Selected Goals Recommended by the 1999 National Gambling Impact 
Study Commiss ion 
Several objectives listed in the Final Report of the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission" (the "1999 U.S. Gambling Commission") were 
~O. BGA REPORT. supra!K)(e S, at 99. 
~I . Su glMralty ugiJ/anlfl Quickly OKs CasUws. supra note 48: STACKlNGTHEDF.CK. supra nOfC 48. 
~2. Su glMral/y BGA R£ra:r.T. supra note 5, at 96-101. 
~3. Suo t.,., EcOflO"'/C Losse E.xcud Gains, supra note 2. at 10. 
54 . Stt. t g .. RIck Aim. ToJctnJ Oursidt Casino PUIlI Start lu.dito, .. PMtl D<wSIt't SIltUt lIuCOfIctf1U 
About wss Umll. KA.\1. CITY STAR, JUDe 29. 2000. aI CI [h-erc1l\alkr ToulU Ouuldt CasillO Pttw 
Statt A"dilOr] 
SS . Sit Itnually NOISC FINAL REPORT. supra note43. 
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notable. The report was submitted under unanimous agreemenl. Many of its 
recommendations recognized the difficulty of regulating the gambl ing industry 
effectively. 
The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission recommended thaL "warnings 
regarding the dangers and ri sks of gambling. as well as the odds where 
feasible. should be posted in prominenllocations in all gambling faci lities:056 
Clearly. the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commiss ion understood the addictive naLure 
of gambling. as well as the potential for excessively large losses. Of course, 
posted warning statements can be disregarded, and misleading advertising 
could be made,H 
Funhermore, the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commiss ion recommended 
restricting alllcgal gambling activities to panicipams who were "at least 21 
years of age and that those who [were] under 21 years of age shou ld not be 
allowed to loiter in areas where gambling activity occurs,,,S8 Specifically 
regarding spons gambling, the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission 
recommended that "betting on collegiate and amateur athletic events that is 
currently legal [in 1999] be banned altogether.,,'9 The 1999 U,S. Gambling 
Commission also warned that lotteries and convenience gambling could play 
"a significant ro le in the development of youthful gamblers.'>60 These 
principles were critically important because. flfst. the rate of pathological and 
problem adolescent gamblers was roughly double that for adults." and second. 
sports gambling was causing adolescents to become "the first U.S. generation 
in 100 years raised to believe that legalized gambling (was] an acceptable 
activity and [had] career opportunities.'~ 
In an attempt to limit the perceived "acceptability" of licensed organized 
gambling activities, the 1999 U,S. Gambling Commission recommended that 
"all relevant governmental gambling regulatory agencies shou ld ban 
aggressive advertising strategies, especially those that target people in 
56. Id. II tho 3, 11; NAT'L GAMBU,"G L",PACT STUDY COMM'N, E.xoclflWl! S UMMARY, 29 (June 1999) 
[htrtlllafltl' NG ISC ExEcVTIVE SUMMARYI 
57 , Su dlscusslOll ofaUc8ed pou:nlial fl1ludulenl act/viI)', infru Part IV. B , undcT "Fabe AdvertISing alld 
Fi:o:ed Games." 
58 NOISC FINAL REPORT, :fUpru ootc 43. ell. 3. al 17 , NOISC ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY. l 'upra ~ 56, al 
29. 
S9. NOISC FlS.o.L REPORT, s"Pra nOle 4) , ell . 3 , al 18, NGtSC ExECUT1VE S UMMARY, ill_pra IKlte S6, al 
]0. 
60 NGISC 1'lN.o.L REPORt, s"PrQ 00le 43, c:h. J. al 19; NGtsc ExEcurIVESUMMAJtY, supra nOle S6, II 
32. 
61 . Su, I ., .• Ei-fHWmir ImpucfS, s"Pra note I. aI66, 117-18 {Clonl Valent L.orenL Exec. Olr., Nalional 
err, PalholoJicai Gamblin" AN OVEJl,VIEW OF PATHOLOGICAJ.. GAAlBUNG, al J (1990)) (The 
eompul$I'-':: pmbhnll1lte ImOIi.llttnaaeTS was .... ~IIO 7 .7 pertenI. ~). 
62. MU.S and mlmlauooal Cosu.M supra 00le 13, a1 13. 
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impoverished neighborhoods or youth anywhere.'>6J This is especially true for 
so-called "convenience gambling:" 
The Commission received testimony that convenience gambling, such as 
electronic devices in neighborhood outlets. provides fewer economic benefits 
and creates potentially greater social costs by making gambling more 
available and accessible. Therefore, the Commission recommends that states 
should not aUlhorit~ any further conlllmience gambling operations and 
should cease and roll back existing operatio"J,'" 
However, the scope of regulatory review was necessarily broader 
concerning the appropriateness or inappropriateness of various degrees of 
licensed gambling. The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission recommended that 
"states and tribal governments should conduct periodic reassessments of the 
various fonns of gambling permitted within their borders for the purpose of 
detennining whether the public interest would be better served by limiting , 
eliminating, or expanding one or more of those forms,,4j Thus. state gambling 
control boards were to prepare to eliminate the various forms of gambling 
from the fastest fonns to the slowest forms66 to reduce mounting social costs. 
This recommendation directly countered the marketing trends and 
accompanying strategies moving toward implementation of faster and faster 
forms of gambling. 
The 1999 U,S. Gambling Commission made several recommendations 
regarding improved enforcement efforts: 
(WJith respect 10 all forms of legal and illegal gambling. the Commission 
recommends that all relevant govemmenlal gambling regulatory agencies 
enact and e nforce harsh penalties for abuse in this area involving underage 
gamblers. Penalties and enforcement effons regarding underage gambling 
63. NGlSC FlN!<l. REI'OII.T. supra IlOU: 43, ch. ), al 18: NGISC EXF£1.1T1YE SUMMARY. supra note 56, at 
30. 
64. NGISe FINAL RIlPORT. supra note 4), cll . 3, at 18 (emplla.sis addtd); NGISC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 
supra note 56. III 3D (emphasis added). 
6S NGISe FlN!<l. REPORT. supra D(J(e 43. th. 3. at 19; NGISC ExOCVTIIIE SU!'4MAAY, supra nole 56, al 
31. 
66. Both the addictiveness of pmbJing and the growth rale of the com:sponding social costs increa~ as 
the spud of the pmbling beoomes faster . Slower forms of pmbijllg illcluded dog and IIorse 1Ja(:ts; 
bingo and ofT !nick beuiDg .... ere somewhat faster forms: casinos and video pmbling macllines wele 
very rapid forms of prnbling. Su ~U.S. and intmlaUoolII COSIS." suprllllOtc 13. it 5. '"The: most 
relevant nllmber IWIlSI the amount /o.n by gambleJ'$ per year in !.he rr/"'lU!1 /fllltUf. . In pmb!illJ 
indusuysrudies, lhe underlying focus [waslllsu.allyoo: (Il how filS' money [couldl be exuac\Cd from 
the publk. and (2) how ~iL"fly m~y [could] be txtrar:&ed from the public."' IOnginal empllasis 
maintained.l {d. Futer pmbling lechnology was one meibod llsed by the industry to aa.:omplish Its 
goals. 
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should be greally increased.'"' 
Enforcement should include a mechanism for recognizing and addressing any 
citizen complaints that might arise regarding advertisements. AdditIOnally. 
the Comm ission recommends that Congress amend the federal truth·in-
advertising laws to include Native American gambling and slllte-sponsored 
lotteries.6I 
The 1999 U.S. Gambling Com miss ion also addressed the problem of the 
"revolving door," in which regulators and industry interests fa nned sweetheart 
relationships that eventually culminated in regulators leavi ng their government 
posts to take jobs in the industry .69 To that end, the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Comm iss ion recommended that ''federal, state. and tribal gambling regulators 
shou ld be subject to a cooling-off period that prevents them from working for 
any gambling operation subject (0 their jurisdiction for a period of I year.,,1lI 
All state and tribal govemments needed to adopt this recommendation in 
spec ific ethics legislation as an anti-corruption measure.11 Fun.her anti-
conuplion measures involved campaign finance refonn aimed at preventing 
the gambling industry from having inordinate influence among legislators : 
The Commission recognizes the difficulty of campaign finance reform in 
general and an industry-specific contribution restriction in particular. 
Nonetheless the Commission believes that there are sound reasons to 
recommend that states adopt tight restrictions on contributions to slate and 
local campaigns by entities---corporate, private, or tribal-that have applied 
for or have been granted the privilege of operating gambling facililies .n 
With regard to the specter of intemet gamb ling. it was encouraging that 
the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission recommended a zero-tolerance policy.ll 
It recognized thai "current technology ... makes it possible for gambling to 
67. NGISC FINAL R!;PORT. 511pra nO(e 4). ch. 3, II 19; NOISC ExEcUT1VE SUMM"IIY, supru note 56, Oil 
32. 
68. NOISCFlNAL REPCRT, 511pra DOte 43. eh. 3, II 111-19: NGISC ExEcVTIV10 SUMMARY, l lIpra DOte '6. 
at 3 I. 
69. Su Rtport of A.uornty Gtntral Ro/)trt AbnlltlJ III Opposition,o ugaflud Casino GamblinK ill Ntw 
York StOlt (May t981) [bereinlfttt A.ttorn,y Gtn,rol Abrams NY Rtport), cittd in BGA REPoRT, 
sllPrrJ 00It 5, a1 99. 
70. NOiSe FINAL ItEPoQr, supra DOte 4), eh. 3, a1 19; NOlSC Ex£ct.mVE SlMMAilY. 1uplll 1IOIe.56. II 
32. 
71. The recommmdatioa $Ul.I had !lOt been Implemeated by nud-2001 
72. NOISC fiNAL REPoRT, supra IIOlc 4], ct. 3, aI 18: NOISe ExEo.mVESUMMARY, supra DOIe .56, i1 
29-30. 
73. Sft NGlSCflNALREPORT, supra _ 43, eh $, at 12: NOISe ExEo.mVEStn.I!IoIAilY,Sllpra note.56, 
II 3S-)6. 
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take place in the home or the office.,,14 Therefore. the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission recommended that "states not pennit the expansion of gambling 
into homes through (internet] technology and the expansion of account 
wagcring.,,1' With respect to legislative enforcement. internet gambling 
received special attention: 
The Commission recommends 10 the President, Congress. and the 
Department of Justice (001) thai the federal government should prohibit, 
without allowing new exemptions or the expansion of existing federal 
exemptions to other jurisdictions, Internet gambling not already authorized 
within the United States or among parties in the United Slates and any 
(oreignjurisdiction. Further, the Commission recommends that the President 
and Congress direct DO! to develop enforcement strategies that include, but 
are not limited to, Internet service providers, credit card providers, money 
transfer agencies, makers of wireless communications systems, and others 
who intentionally or unintentionally facilitate Inlemet gambling 
transactions.'o 
(Similarly.] (tlhe Commission recommends to the President, Congress. and 
state governments the passage of legislation prohibiting wire transfers to 
known Internet gambling sites, or the banks who represent them . 
Furthermore. the Commission recommends the passage of legislation stating 
that any credit card debts incurred while gambling on the Internet are 
unrecoverable. n 
It was espec ially important to prohibit Internet gambling, because a failure to 
do so effectively opened a video gambling casino in every home and office. 
increasing the accessibility of gambling to the point of ubiquity. 
The position of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission with respect to 
gambling on Indian lands was less precisely articulated. However, it 
recognized the need to curtail gambling operations that were either effectively 
uncontrolled or in volved unclear jurisdictional authority between the state and 
federal governments-identifying the need that "the federal government fully 
and consistently enforce all proviSions of the IGRA [Indian Gaming 
74, NGISe FlNoIJ... REPORT, .'upm noo. 43. ch. 5. at 12; NGISe ExECUT!\'F. SUMMARY, r"pro note 56. at 
)S-36. 
75. f'OGtSC Fl~Al. REPORT. supro noo. 43, ch. 5, at 12; NOlSC ExFcIJTIV!l;5UMMARY, supra nOte 56 ... 
36. 
76. NGISC FINAl. REPORT. s"Pro. note 43. ch. 5. at t2; NGlSe Ex£cUT!VE SUMMARY, S"pnl Dote 56, It 
l5. 
77. NOiSe FI, .... Al. REPoRT, S"Pro. noo. 4), ch. 5. al 12, NOISC ExEcIJTIVE SUMMARY, supro. DOle 56. at 
l5. I 
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Regulatory Acl] .,,71 The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission also recommended 
"that Congress shou ld specify a constitutionall y sound means of resolving 
disputes between stales and tribes regarding (casinol ga mbling"79 whic h 
seemed to occur most often when an Indian group sought to build a casino 
against the wishes of the state. 
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Fines for Violations of Gambling Regulations Were Traditionally Too 
Low 10 Function as Meaningful Enforcement Devices 
Fines were a cammon fonn of regulation which provided disincentives for 
actors to behave in the manner identified as undesirab le. They essentially 
redefined the costs of the undesired behavior. The fines became increasingly 
effective as the costs outweighed the benefits of undertaking the undesired 
behavior.1e Under normal circumstances. fines were effective deterrents 
because money was limited. at least to the extent that the actor would benefit 
more by choosing an alternate course of action that did not risk a fine. 
The multi-billion dollar gambling industry was not normal in that sense; 
the scarcity of money did not necessarily constrain the industry as long as the 
public continued to transfer more money to it via gambling 10sses.'1 This 
drive to remain open and operating produced flagrant violations. For 
example, EmeraJd Casino Inc. began construction on a proposed casino in 
Rosemont, Illinois even before the Illinois Gaming Board voted on its license 
application, because the casino estimated it had to forego $25 million per 
78. NGISC FINAL REPal.T, SUprrl note 43, ch. 6. II 23; NGlS( ExEc(JTIVE SUMMARY. supra DOle S6, at 
38. 
79. NGISC FINAL REPORT. supra nolt 43, ch. 6, at 23: NGISC EX[ClJflVE SUMMARY, 1upra nme 56. al 
38-39; 25 U.S.c. 2701-2721 (2000). 
80. This (:QIIeepI applied tile normal ~e assumption lIIal actors would acl rationally, secklDJ 10 
RWlimiz.e their lIet bellcfit (j.~ .. benefits las COSI$) When levied , fiDeS adOcd 10 the cost of 
underlakinJ tile actioll d iscowaged by «:Julation. As a more pnclical mallei", the upec:ted increase 
i n COSt due 10 a fine WH!be produa of Ihe fine itself aDd !be prob.I bility it would be levied . For this 
fU$OII, when c reating an effective regulation, Ihe li ne needed 10 be high enough aDd enfOTUd 
frcquentiyenooglllO change the incentive for an ac1tlc 10 UIlderlake the socially ulldesirable behavior. 
II Consider, for example , the receipt by the California GamblJal ConIrOl CommissiOll of Ma hUJe 
cbeck--S34.S million. rfOlll soun:es they're still tryina 10 diseemM appaKndy allocated to an lDdian 
revenue-s}w1ng fund 0vtrS«D by IhatCommission. Todd Murpby, Gt"iIII Dow" UI B~Js, L"T 'L 
GAMING &: WAGERI:'G 8 0$., Feb. 2001, at 14. ''Officials were COIIfused by the che<:k beI:&IlK tbefe 
was no breakdown alwhicb tribes provided how much oItbe $34 5 IUlUion ... ~ ld. &I 16. 
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month in revenue until it opened,Bl After its in vestigation, the Illinois Gaming 
Board denied Emerald Casino' s license application. citing concerns that "some 
investors ... 'provided false and misleading information to the Board and 
failed to establish a record of regulatory compliance .... ] and ''the proposed 
casino' s lalleged) links to organized crime.,,84 At $25 million per month. the 
estimated. revenues for that casino alone were approximately $800.000 to$I.0 
million every day,U In fact, this example paralleled the conventional wisdom 
in the gambling industry during the 1990's that the average well-run casino 
should bring in approximately $1.0 million per day. 
Taking the projected revenue model of the Emerald Casino as an example, 
the failure of fines as a regulatory mechanism in the gambling industry 
became cJear.K6 Assuming a casino in this model enjoyed an even stream of 
daily revenues of $1.0 million and was pennitted to operate six days per week. 
Thus, it was open twenty-six days per month on average and therefore 
expected nonnal monthly revenues of $26 mi llion. Evcn if this casino 
received a fine of $100,000 once during the month for some serious breach of 
conduct. this fine was insignificam: instead of making $26 million that 
month, thc casino in this model made $25.9 million. The cost of the fine was 
less than 0.39 percent of the casino's revenue for the month, orO.03 percent 
for the year. Thus, the fine was barely noticeable when compared to the 
casino's revenue from operations. and therefore failed to change the casino's 
behavior. Instead , the rational decision from the perspective of the casino 
operator was to continue to violate the law, for the casino took in higher 
revenues from non-compliant activities whether or not it was fined. When the 
occasional fine was levied, it was a mere cost of doing business, because the 
casino stitt enjoyed higher revenues than if it were to comply with the law. 
82. Dooalas Holt & Michael Higgins, Roumoni Casino Wort Halts A,/I~r Statt Rtbllu. ca. TRIB., Feb. 
26. 2000. I I. II I [hereinlflCT Won: Halts A,/Itr St(l{t R~bllbJ . 
83. Patricia Richardson. Boord Dtllits IWUmonl Casino, CRAlN'S CHI, Bus,. Jan. 30. 2001, aWlilabl~ 
(l{ Ill1p :llwww .chicagobll~llle~~ .CQfIl [hcreinafter Board Dtllin RoumOll1 Casino). 
84. Id. Sual:.'o Tim Novak. Mob Tin Sillk Rru~monlCasino. CI-Q. SU:-.;·TIMES. Jan. 31. 2001. al 1-2. 
85. Depellding on how many business days the casino was open, expected daily re~enuC5 baud on the 
S25 million per month revenue e$timau, (su War!: Halts Aft~r Sia/~ Rtblilcl , sup'a 110Ie 82) were II 
least SO.8 million per day OIllverage if the casillO wa5 open every day. If Ihe cas;1I11 was clOied one 
day per week and the monthly revtnue was still S2S millioo. I/w;n the corrcspooding Upecled daily 
revenues rose 10 j,pprox;rn.au,ly 51.0 million per day. 
86. This model used the estilYUl\al reVCIIllCS from the then"Ilroposed cui"o in Rosemont, JUinois (su 
Work 111:1/1:1 A,ftu Sttl/t Rtbub. supra nott: 82) 10 illustnte the ineffectiveness 01 fines a.! a regulator)' 
teclmique in the gamblln, industry. The iiceme application or Emerald CaJinn to opuile in 
Rosemoot was denied by the 11I111ois Camilli BlW1l on other i'OUlU:Li . Suo t.,., &>ard D~niu 
RoumOIll C/IJiIIo, Jllpra nolC 83. lbc decision of !he: HlinOiS Garning Board 10 deny Emenld I 
casino heensc dId nOillTea the lllIalysis oltbc: inclT«1IVC1le5$ of filla . 
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To achieve compliance rather than routine indifference to the laws, all 
regulato!)' incentives need to be corrected to ensure that a casino found 
violating the law would be made worse ofCthan if it had voluntarily complied 
with the law. This necessarily involves selling the fine and the frequency of 
enforcement such mat a casino choosing to skirt the law could regularly 
expect to lose a substantial ponioD of its revenue. To continue the model of 
a serious breach of conduct, an effective fine needed to be at least three 
percent to eight percent of the projected yearly revenuc-<orresponding to 
roughly one-third to one-half of the revenues for that month. or $10-25 
million in this model. Such a fine would catch the attention of the casino 
operators and investors. and induce compliance with the law. A set 
percentage of revenue as a fine would be easily calcu lated from the specified 
casino's own reports, and therefore would be more practical as distinguished 
from the more speculative and argumentative "nat fines" or fines predicated 
upon a certain portion of the average revenue earned by the median operator 
in the industry. A set percentage would be more successful at inducing 
operators to voluntarily comply with the regulations. 
The nature of the violations during the 1990's illustrated the 
ineffectiveness of fines to regulate the gambling industry. The best illustration 
of this phenomenon came from Missouri. which had the reputation within the 
gambling industry of being "the toughest state in which to do business."t? The 
Missouri Gaming Commission enforcement efforts exemplified several 
categories of violations that almost certainly occurred in other jurisdictions 
with less stringent enforcement of gambling regulations. 
I . Cash -Related Violations 
During the 1990's there were several examples offines for alleged security 
or procedural violations. In Missouri. for example, Players Island was fined 
$75,000 for "alleged violations that included unattended cash drawers. 
improper employee access to slot machine cash drop boxes and fai lure to 
contact a jackpot winner who had been underpaid $1125."" The Flamingo 
Hilton Casino was fined S50,OOO for "allegations of unsecured keys and 
improperly stored cash and casino tokens. "" Station Casino in St. Charles 
was fined $20,000 when its security officers "allegedly were playing cards in 
17. Ru BUlnai.ll. Missorm Muds1iltfint. L""-·LGA..\Ol IHG .t: WAGEIUN(; Bus., Jail. 2001. al IS. 22. 
I I . 1Jt~f GUinDI FUrrd.KA.~. Qrv STAll. Su.nc 29. 2000. II CI. 
89. Jd. 
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the surveillance room ... instead of watching monitors."to 
Some states had "loss limit" laws, by which casinos were supposed to 
limit patrons to a preset amount of tokens. In theory. this rule prevented 
excess ive losses during anyone visit to the casino. However. these Jaws were 
difficult to enforce. For example. a check in 1999 of six of the twelve casinos 
in Missouri revealed violations al all of them.'1 in this investigation "each of 
the six casinos checked by investigators working undercover [was] hit with 
fines of $10,000 for allowing gamblers to purchase tokens or chips in excess 
of the [$500] limit or for Dol recording the purchases on electronic cards 
designed to track losses.'t9l Missouri Gaming Commission Chair Julian 
Seehennan compared the routine violation of loss limits by the casinos to 
theft: '''(T]his is no different than stealing .... The fact that every casino is 
at fault means we really have lousy discipline ..... 3 
In another scenario. the Missouri Gaming Commission fmed the Argosy 
Casino $225.000 for 42 violations over several months during 1998." The 
casino was cited for allegedly permitting entry on several occasions by two 
people banned from all Missouri casinos. Argosy was also fined for a range 
of alleged procedural violations. including "inappropriate storage of tokens. 
slot machines accepting U.S. currency. procedural errors in the counting of 
tokens and money. lack of enforcement of loss limits, and failure to file 
reports on transactions of more than $10.000 with the Gaming Commission 
and Internal Revenue Service''':! pursuant to federal anti-money-laundering 
laws. Similarly, violations of curbs to combat money laundering cost the 
Trump Taj Mahal Casino in Atlantic City S477 ,000 in 1998 for 106 violations. 
and by comparison. in 1993 then Atlantic City casinos had been fined $2.5 
million for such violations.96 
90. Rick Aim. SIQI/im Quinos 10 Pay Finu, KAN. Crry STAR, Mar. 13. 1999, al CI (hereinafter SUU/OII 
C4IiIIoJ 10 Pay Fi/IU] . 
91. Rudi Keller. Six Casinos Fau FinufoT VWIaMg um Umill. COLUMBI .... DAlLV l'RJB. (Columbia. 
Mo.), July 29. 1999. 
9'2 . /d. 
93 . Id. 
IU. Rudolph Huster. ""'Dry CasUoo Focrl $22$,000 ill FW$: R~,u/alorJ AJ/~lt 42 Vioia/;OfU ill ·98: 
AppNlIJ POJJlblt , !VoN. CrTY Sf All. Feb. 25, 1999. II CI 
95. Id. 
96. In 199BIlle Trump TaJ Ma.haI Casino ill Atlantic City. New Jersey. was fined 5471,(0) for viobtin, 
JaWI 10 cwb ITIOIIe)" launderin, 011 106 oc:asioas. ~~ Tnuy Ta} MaluJl FillN $477,000 by Fed. 
&IIkJ", RtguwloTI, Dow klh'ES NEWSWlRES. Jan. 28, 1998. 'The Taj Mab&i failed 10 file C\trKncy 
TllIlI5aClion ReportS for patrons tradio, lmounlS in ea:eeu 0($10,000 either 10 or from chips. Id At 
lhe time il was wur.d.. the fine agaiDSI the Taj MahaJ was "(be [hilliest) levied apillSl I easino fot 
IIiobtions of tile Bank Secrecy Aa. ~ fd 
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2. Gambling by Minors 
Adolescents of the 1990's were "the first U.S. generation in 100 years 
raised to believe that gambling [was} an acceptable activity. and hard] career 
opportunities.'o9J Not surprisingly. the percentages of adolescent pathological 
and problem gamblers were typically between double and triple the reported 
numbers for the adult population." Despite prohibitions. incidents of 
underage gambling exist For example. two Missouri riverboat casinos. 
Station and Harrah's, were each fined $250.000 for an incident in June, 2000 
when a 16·year-old girl used false identification to board and gamble.9Il The 
mother of the girl in this incident was charged "with a class B underage 
gambling misdemeanor Ihatcarries a penalty of up to six months in the county 
jail and a fine of up to $500" if convicted. loo The c harges also included 
allegations that Station Casino had admitted 20-year-old males bearing false 
identification on separate occasions in May and June of 2000. 101 Furthermore. 
Station Casino was fined $5.000 for a separate incident in November. 1998 for 
failing to prevent a J6-year-oJd male from entering the casino and gambling 
on s lot machines. The adolescent's mother was also charged with allowing a 
minor to gamble, and faced up to 6 months in jail. IO! 
Station Casinos Inc .. one of two cas inos fined $250.000 in August. 2000. 
previously paid another $250.000 fine in J997. when a 12-year-old girl was 
caught gambling at a slot machine. IOl Arguably. the previous $250,000 fine 
was not a sufficient incentive to cause the casino to raise its security to a level 
which would stop any minors from gaining entry. According to the Missouri 
Riverboat Gaming Association. an industry organization. 29,800 minors were 
identified and refused admittance to Missouri Casinos in 1997. 1001 However, 
critics could argue that this statistic did not necessarily demonstrate any 
97. ~II' "u.s. and lntematiOD.1.l Casu:· swpra DOle I), at IJ. 
93. Su AN OVUVlEW OF PATHOI..CGICAL GAMBLlNCi. swpra note 61. at 3 ( 1990) (''lbe compulsive 
pmblinJ rate amOll1 ~n.aJer5 ii 4 percent 10 7.7 percent. ~); BOA REPORT. Shpf'Q nOle.5, al 28. (In 
1992. the ranlii:e of .doIcsocnlS who were already problem or compulsive pmbler5 was between 4 
perttnt Ind 15 pm:eol.). 
99. Riek Aim. Station. Ha"ah 's Hj! wj!" S25O,000 FIfI~S, !CAN CrrY StAR, AUi. 30. 2000. It CI 
(he.einafter SIaIlOl/. Harrah's Hil wilh S15O,000 FiII.tt]' 
100 Id 
101 Id. 
102. Rick AIm, Cmn",i.uimll.m H.//(Jft OjfHooir. i'l B,iury CDR, KA,'IJ CtTY STAll, Jan. 28, 1999, at Cl 
[heftinafter Coon",iu-imI uls Hill.". Off Hoot] . 
103. Sl<>lIOR. HarraJ. ·s Hil .. ·ith S250,OOO FIIIU, SwprQ note 99, I I CI 
104 Cmr""iu-w.. uU HiJlol1 Off Hook. Sll/ua IK"U 102. I I CI . 
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diligence in the efforts by the casinos to keep minors from gambling. but 
instead raised the question of why almost 30,000 minors,05 gravitated to 
Missouri casinos in 1997,,06 
B. False Advertising and Fixed Games 
The Missouri Gaming Commission fined Station Casino $21.825 in 1999 
for false advertising claims and regulatory vioiations. 107 The alleged false 
advertising involved the "out-of-daleand misleading" claim made in 1997 that 
Stalion offered the "loosest slots .. 1os ("industry jargon for devices that relUm 
the highest percentage of jackpot payouts to players"),'09 and the claim that 
"Stalion Casino Kansas City offered 'over 400' nickel and dime slot machines 
... [when the number of such] machines at Slation had dwindled to fewer than 
200.,,"0 
The Missouri Commission also reprimanded two companies, Universal 
Manufacturing and Bingo Systems and Supply, "for their roles in a rigged 
pull-tab promotion., ,11 1 The Commission found that "insiders knew which box 
of unsold cards contained the winning ticket.,·lll Additionally it "intended to 
revoke Bingo Systems' state license over the incident," but the disciplinary 
action was not pursued after the company was sold. II) The scenario of selling 
a gambling company or license exemplified a typical industry tactic whereby 
gambling interests could profit substantially-instead of being fined or 
disciplined. 
lOS. 11Ie actual number of minors that ancmpfed entnncc to Missouri casinO$ In 1997 could have been. 
in faa. much higher than 30.000. The number published by the Missouri Riverboal Gaming 
Association only refla;r.::d the number of mioon rumed I"""y. Howcver. scvcral fines have been 
iuucd for mi1lOl'l as YOWlR as 12:INn old who successfully entered casinos and a;ambled. StaIUm, 
lIarrah 'S Hil wilh $2x}.OOO F~~J. supra note 99. at CI . Thcrefore. it was apparent that the easinos 
wcre IlOl completely sucressful at bkd:ioa; all attempts by rrunQrs Iu coler aDd /Iambic. Su ill 
106 Su HlU'vard Addictions Meta·analysis. supra note 12. (2.2 million patllolo&icaJ (ldol~Jufl/ pmblcrs. 
5.7 million problemadoitS('tnl pmblcn nationwide in 1997), CllfilllI"U.S aDd International CO$ts." 
, .. pra DOte 13,11 Table 10 aDd ~yin, fOOIDOIeS. 
107 SluliOll Casinos to Pay FiMs, , ,,pro IIOk: 90. al CI. 
108 Id 
109 Id 
110 Id 
III Id 
112 Id 
113. Id 
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V. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS 
A. The Backlash Against the Gambling Industry and Associated 
Government Officials 
J. Experts Noted Links between Gambling Activities and Crime 
a. Links between Gambling Activities and Organized Cri me 
[Vol. 27 
Paralleling his 1995 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary. former organized crime member William Jahoda 
noted in 1998 that crime costs associated with legalized gambling were so 
overwhelming that its supporters were "either 'ignorant' or 'on the take. "'II ~ 
lahoda frequently highlighted that state-sanctioned gambling activities were 
like "heaven on earth" for organized crime. lIS Attorney General for New 
York. Robert Abrams, concluded that "the casino environment offers 
organized crime groups the opportunity to engage in a wide range of illegal 
and luc rative activities which include juice loans and prostitution,,,116 
Furthermore , during the 19905, experts found growing evidence that for every 
dollar in new legalized gambling there was one dollar (or more) in new illegal 
gambling, ll7 
11", William Jlboda. AddrHI to the Midwesl Confnmec 0( the Nat'l Coalition Apinst Lcplizcd 
Gamblilll, Des Moines. IoWi (May 1-2. 1998) [llcreinafler Saholla 1998 Speecb in Des Moines]; su 
N(lIio1lll1 Gambling Imptlct and Policy Comm'n Act: H~Clrin& Oil H,R. 497 b~fou th~ HOllSt Comm . 
OtIlh~ Jwdiciory, 104tlI CorII., lsI Sess. 60-89 ( 199S) {$tatcmenl and testimony of William Jahoda, 
former member 0( orpniud ai~) (bneinafler COtIlrusiotull GWtlilJlIII HtarillS 1995). 
115. Jahoda 1998 Speech in Des Moines, sllpra OOIC 114; su Con&rtssioflO/ GWtlbiU!& Hro,UI& 1995, 
supra note 114 , al60-39. 
116. AltornQ General Abrams N Y R~port, s"'pra nOte 69, as cited in BGA REPORT. supra note 5. al 91 
( 1992). 
117. Statcmml aad TestimoayofWilliam G. Hall, Executiye Director, Ul . Economic eft FiSCal Committee, 
before the minois Lcgislati~ Gunblinl Tasle Force, Sprinlfield, 01., on July 20, 1996. ~t GaJfIbliJIK 
In llIino/s: /u History. Rtvt",,' and FlillUt Tund!, BefOrt Ih~ III. uIIs/arivt TCIJ"t Foret 0/1 
Gamhlin&. Sprill&fitld, 1Il.( July 20, 1996( {s tal£menlof William G. Han, Exec. Oil . &: Ed ..... ard Bou, 
Chief Ecoo., ro. Ecoa. eft fiscal Comm' n.}. Gunblina critics indicaled thai tbc series of s0cio-
economic neptives ~ ill the seriatim 1996 bcariup of tbc Illinois LcJisbitivc: Task Fortt on 
Gamblinl wne so embarrauiDI to lamblina proponents that those public beannp were never printnl 
fordissemination 10 the public and the pre5$. Sualso ConlrusiDfw/ Gambling Htarin, 1995,supra 
note 114. II 60-89. ~t also JIhodI 1998 Speech in Deli Moines. supra nolc 114 
2(03) Regulating the Gambling Industry 
According to William Iahoda. 
there always existed one sohd conslam-any new form or expansion of legal 
gambling always increased our client base ... . Of most benefit to us in the 
illegal gambling underworld were: (a> agency marketing and media 
advertising blitzes promoti ng gambling . . . and (b) the resultant 
desensItization within the community from the reality that most forms of 
gambling. .. are by their very nature an actual and potentially dangerous 
vice.1II 
241 
Bob Walsh, Assistant Director of the Chicago FBI du ri ng the early 1990's, 
nOled that "gambl ing generates new gambling; the more accepted it becomes. 
the more all forms of gambling benefit .... Organized crime is continuous ly 
involved in gambling."u9 Also, "William Roemer, a retired Sen ior FBI Agent 
on Organized Crime in Chicago for twenty-two years, agreed that, '(e]ven if 
you can keep them out of the casinos, the Mafia will still benefit immensely 
through increased illegal gambling, loan-sharking. and other such activities . 
. . . I don't see how it could be effectively regulated " ,120 
b. Links between Gambling Act ivities and Whi te-Collar Crime 
Of course. legalized gambling is a catalyst for crime. Some gamblers 
commit crimes to fuel their habil. Others conupted by the vast amounts of 
money flowing through gambling facilit ies, also commit crimes. During the 
1980's and 1990's white-<:ollar crime, rooted in gambling. plagued the 
American insurance industry with billions of dollars of costs. III In general, 
"insurance-related fraud, embezzlement. [and] arson in connection with 
[pathological] gambling" appeared to be common, with 47% of241 Gamblers 
Anonymous members admitting to such behavior. III Of those surveyed, 
"[o]nly 8 percent of those who had defrauded insurance companies claim to 
have made partia l or total restilulion.',l2l Perhaps the worst case of insurance 
118. BOA REPORT,lyra DOte 5, at 92. 
119. Tesllmony of Bob WilI.\h befQrt Ibc Chicago Metro EthiCS CoalJtioo panel oolambool, June 25, 
1992. riled III. BOA REPORT. ~Ilpro note S. al 93. 
120 BOA R£FoRT, lupro nOlc S. at 91 (empllasis added) 
121 Henry R Lesieur" Kennctb Pull-''''Nronn. P,obkmsaNl Palllo/Q,~aJ GlUnblllll.)I . QAMIILL-.c; 
BEHAv., 12) (1981) By 1987. costs 10 the indl.lStry from ptlhololll21 pmblinl iochMied S)) bllI)(ID 
In fraud and an additiooaJ S66 billion in surrendered policies Id.; IU also A.A. OFF Gov .. CASI:-"OS 
IS A..oaIOA AN ASALYS!5 OFTKE EcONOMlC AND Socw..lMPACTS 67 (1994); Economic umu 
Euull Gainl, supn. note 2, at 7. 
122. LesicW" &:: Pili., lupra IlOI£ 121. at 123. 
123. Id. at 121. 
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fraud was a mOlher who was convicted llA and sentenced to twenty-one years 
in prisonl2J after aJlegedly killing her baby daughter to collect insurance 
money to continue gambling. l16 Another daughter "(f]ifteen months earlier . 
. . . died of unexplained causes:'1n 
Various types ofwhite-<:ollar crime also developed apart from insurance-
related schemes. A few examples from the end of the 20th century highlight 
the problems. In 2000, Argosy Gaming Co. was reportedly under 
investigation for allegations it defrauded shareholders and violated state 
regulations via a business relationship which included misrcpresenting a $3.5 
million loan to a SI. Louis businessman. '28 In 1996. Missouri charged two 
would-be bingo operators with "fil ing false license application information 
with the Missouri Gaming Commission."'2'9 The two "allegedly used the 
corporate identification number of a real firm with a name similar to the name 
they were using in order to meet the state's five-year existence requirement to 
sponsor bingo games."I:lO So-<:alled "charitable gambling" activities often 
created not only increased public acceptability of non-charitable gambling 
activities (e.g., by casinos), but also rampant fraud which diminished the 
reputations of all charitable fund-raising activities. In Virginia. more than a 
dozen operators of charitable gambling activities were arrested in 1997 and 
1998 on various charges mat included fraud. embezzlement. illegal gambling. 
and winning by cheating. III In Illinois. the state charged five individuals with 
"running illegal Las Vegas nights for Chicago area charities and then ripping 
them off:·m The government sought a $300,000 penalty.m In that incident, 
gamblers allegedly were instructed "to make the[irJ checks out to cash or leave 
the payee line blank."I~ These checks were deposited in a private account lH 
124. Man O·Connor. Mot"", COfIvlcttd of Fraud III [Hath r(211d Baby Da/jghtu, CHI. TlUII .. Feb. 12, 
1999. 12. at 4 (bercioafter Moth" COIlvicrtd of f,a~dJ . 
125. Min O'Coonor. P,isOtl StllttflCt ill Baby's Killill,: MOIfI USM fllslirlUlU Montyfor Gamblill6. CHI. 
nUll" Sept. 9. 1999. 12. at 6 [~loafltr Mom Ustd fIlS. MOfItyfor Gamblillg) . 
126. Su /d.: Matllt, COIIvicud of Fralid. Jlipra mote 124 fl. al 4: Cam Simpson.BDby fh011l Plot Told: 
Subu,b Mom IlIdicttd ill IllS. Schtnlt. Cill. SUN·TlMES. Mar. 7. 1995, al I (hereillafter &>/1)' Dtalh 
"fOl Told) . 
ITT. Mom UJM IllS. MOIIryfurGamblu.,.Jupra note 125. 12, a16 .. Stf'o/so Boby fhatllP/or TuM, sliPrll 
n\l(e 126. at I: MOIht, CO'Wic'td of Frolid, )upra nole 124. 12, al 4 
12S. Patricia Richardson. StOlt PIUll!I ProbUlg RiW!rboal. CRAIN·SCHI. Bus ,Sept. 11. 2000, al I, 58-59. 
129. 8in,0 Applicants Indic'td. KAN. CITy STAR, Apr. 27, 1996. al C2. 
1l0. Itt 
Ill. Matthew Dolan, Ex·MCI/Ii1&u of Binso Olirfit Pltods olilff)' ItJ Embtu.JIIlg, VIRGINIAN-PILoT 
(Norfolk, VI.). Jan. 27, 1998, al 05. 
112. Sieve: Wannblr. FiN CWIN in Dtfraw/Ulg Charity EwfIU. au. SUN-n"!I:S. Sept. 16. 2000. II 10 . 
Ill. Id. 
134. Id. 
US. Sle id. 
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to "collect the cash and hide how much was actually colJected."IJ6 Thus, 
legalizing some fonns of gambling neither slowed illegal gambling nor other 
crimes often associated with gambling. 
2. Regulatiolls Were Ignored, Circumvenled. and Blocked by rhe Gambling 
Industry 
One technique the industry commonly uses to circumvent regulations is 
legal political contributions to gain influence. The industry then utilizes its 
lobbying power to bypass unfavorable regulations. The inordinate amounts 
of money available to gambling imerests mean they are not financially limited 
in pursuing their political goals. In New Jersey, the second state to gel casino 
gambling, the gambling industry 's conduct constilUtes a classic example. 
Once gambling was legalized In Atlantic City and Ihe casinos were able to 
show their strength. the casinos put enormous pressure on government 
officials to. 'subvert and erode casino control mechanisms ... " Afler only 
a few years in the state, the casmo industry . , . [was successful in easing Ihe 
regUlations] which they accepted when they came into the state,l)? 
Thereafter. the gambling industry exerted its lobbying power in other states 
as well as New Jersey.llI 
Casinos have demonstrated no hesitation in challenging the authority of 
regulators when inconvenienced by regulatory actions. Possibly in response 
to the Missouri Attorney General's filing of perjury charges for allegedly lying 
to regulators, legislators introduced a bill in 1996 to abolish the Attorney 
General's authority to initiate "criminal cases related to gambling,"l)9 When 
the state Court of Appeals ruled the Attorney General of Missouri had original 
jurisdiction to prosecute criminal gambling offenses, (41) the state legislature 
voted later that same day to prevent the Attorney General from exercising this 
136, Id. 
137 IIl/rlrntyGtl1tralllbro"ls NY N~por1, supra note 69.lIS rittd III BGA REPoRT. lupro note S, at 98-99. 
138. Su, t g. UIl ,slUlUrr Qllickly OKs o.S'''01. slipra BOlt 48. at A3. Su abo STACKlNQ THE DOCK. 
supra DOle 48. It 8-9 (noting that w gamb~llg indusuy was I Ie~jng contributor to politicians, and 
tlat w contributions a llowed Ihc indllSlJy to secure favonbk cmditiofts). 
139. Robert Sigman. EdltoriaJ, Assault on UJwEnjorc_"t, KAN OTv STAll., Apr 28,1996, ill Kl, 
140. SUle v. Becka. No. 68-779, 19% Mo. App. LEXIS 628, at'S (Mo. App. Apr 16. 1996). UI"d lM 
othLr IfOoonds. 938 S.W.2d 267. al 268 ( 1997) ("(nbc plain meanin& or the laS! sentenCe or the 
5U1tute ilille] the Attorney GeoenI 'COOCurretlt junsdJ(:uoo' with the IoI;aI prosccUllol attome)'. 
Under the plain lanlua~ of1.hesutute. the Attoroc~ Gcllefll', authonty 10 prosecute (was ) equivalellt 
to that of w local pros«"IItina anomey Both bald) such lulbority Indepmdml 0( Iny 
rt'C"Ol"l\lTleDduoa or rdemll by the Garrollil Commi5$ion·~l 
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authority.I.1 Legislators claimed the vote was not a reaction to the court 
decision.'42 However, because ''there (was] a backlash (against gambling in 
Missouri] building"'·) it seemed more likely that gambling interests instigated 
the original bill to limit the Attorney General's authority rather than the state 
legislature enacting the bill on its own. Regardless of the reasons, the 
legi slation's practical effect limited the enforcement powers of the Missouri 
Attorney General's office, thereby benefiting gambling interests. 
In addition to trying to limit the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of 
Missouri. gambling industry members were also willing to challenge the 
authority of state gaming regulators. At a hearing in August, 2000 into the 
activities of casino lawyer Michael Lazaroff, "Station [Casino] executives 
challenged the [Missouri Gaming] [CJommission' s investigative authority and 
refused to honor subpoenas to testify."l"" Early in 2000, "Lazaroff pleaded 
guilty in federal court in St. Louis to multiple felonies, including 
misappropriation of more than $800,000 in law-firm funds."I" In testimony, 
Lazaroff characterized his relationship wilh former Missouri Gaming 
Commission Chairman Robert Wolfson loWi as "an illicit and 'tac it 
understanding' that each would provide the other with useful information."lH 
Despite these accusations, the authorities found no wrongdoing by Wolfson. I., 
However, when the executives of Station Casino refused to honor the 
Commission's subpoenas, the Commission unanimously voted to revoke the 
Station Casino's licenses.I'9 This appeared 10 be an effective regulatory 
response. However, the practical effect of the Commission's action was 
almost nothing, because the casino appealed, and continued its operations. 150 
141. KC:Yl.1I MlIlJlby. Oppon~nlS FauJrTitrlint ofM~a.s,u.,; BUI ro £.Unir NI(}m~yG~nUdl's Powtr Follows 
Conrrory Co~n R~li .. ,. KAN. CITY STAR, Apt'. 18, 1996, at CI 1hc:m .... 1\c:r BUI to Limit A.tto,"~ 
G~ .. ~ro/'s Po"'~r): Ten)' Ganey. S~nOfors WOI/Id CUI Nixl)ll's Po .... .,rs: Gamblin, Pros~C:l/tioru 
Barrd Und~~ MUlSl4rt, ST. lOuIS PQsT·DISPATCH. Apr 18. 1996. It BI {hereinaftc:r GanW/i .. , 
Pros«urioru Barnd Under MtClSllre). 
142. Bill foUn!irll1f(}rntyG~ntrof 's Powtr, supra note 141.atCI. GtJlllblin, Prost(lllions Barrtd Undtr 
M~a.sIl~"Jllpro DOle 141 , II BI. 
143. Laura Scon, Irt tltt Public: 11I1<!r~SI. K.A.N CITY STAR, May I , 1996, at C6. 
144. Rick Aim, KC Ca.SUW FQC~s Loss ofU~ns<!.· MU101lrj Rt,lIfa/(Jf$ Maw to 011.1'1 Slalion, KAN.CrrY 
STAR, AuS. 31, 2000, &1 AI [he«ioafta KC CasUlO Fans l.oJs of lkomstl 
14$. 1d. Su a/sl1 Rick Aim, Ca.sino wwytr Pl~adJ Gudty ill U.S. Ct., JeAN. CrTv STAR, JUDe 13, 2000, 
al CI ("Lazaroff {allegedly] defrauded lIis lilW firm partnc:rl and clic:n15 of /IlCJfe!han $870,000 .. . j. 
146. Wolfsoo served as the chainnan of the MWouri Gamina Commission from iu esublisllmenl in 1993 
undl Februuy 1999. Sit KC Ca.SUW FdCt~ Loss of Licuu<!, SWPf'Q DOle 144, II A I. 
'41. 1d. 
148. Su id. (MISSOUri state law bad "no dUClplinary saDCtlOIIS lpinsl COIl1lD.lllJIODCn or forma 
commiSiiooenM ) . 
149 Id 
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Thus. the casino could continue to bring in $1 million per day Ul as it 
challenged the regulatory actions by the Commission. 
In another example of circumvention. casinos would not shut down even 
to address safety issues because so much money was flowing through them. 
For example. Station Casino allegedly demonstrated its indifference for the 
safety of its patrons when the Missouri Gaming Commission proposed to close 
temporari ly one of its two riverboats due to safely hazards caused by silting. U2 
A mandatory underwater inspection found that si lting was causing 3tleast one 
barge in the complex to settle in the river mud. "threatening passenger areas 
with shifting floor levels and the possibility of emergency [exit1 doors 
becoming jammed."Ul The inspectors reported that "[t1he conditions 
'constitute(d] an unacceptable and inappropriate level of risk to the safety of 
the public. ,, ·1~ However. casino officials obtained a restraining order 
preventing the Commission from temporarily closing the boat. IS' 
Also, Missouri Auditor Claire McCaskill complained the gambling 
industry regularly dodged state regulations in several ways. lS6 
The audll alleged the gambling commission allowed: (I ] (sJuppliers who 
provide slot machines and other equipment to the casinos to bypass a full 
background investigation ... [2] [c]asinos to have slot machines that do not 
have the proper identification or did not correlate with those filed with the 
state ... (and 3) [clasi nos to usurp the $500 loss limIt .... 157 
Even worse. however, the Gaming Commission did not seem to demand 
compliance on these issues. lSI In another instance. the same Commission took 
no di sciplinary action against the parties involved in a bribery scanda l in 1998 
and 1999. In this case.. "(tJhe Missouri Gaming Commission ... let Hilton 
Hotels Corp. walk away from a Kansas City casino bribery scandal 
unscathed:·JS9 Hilton merely surrendered its gaming license when it sold the 
riverboat to another operator. lIiO By comparison, "Hilton agreed 10 pay the 
federal government more than $500,000 [in 1998] to avoid a criminal trial on 
LS L. Srfl Jwprn notes 82. 8S and accompanying lUI. 
152. Rick Aim, Action by Caslllo Rtgwknorl Blod:~d, K..+.N. CITY STAA. Jan. 28, 1999, II 0 . 
ISl. Jd. 
\54. Jd. 
155. Jd. 
156 CaroI)'Il Tun. ,., .. dr, $o,s Gamin8 /ttr1try e>oa"., £nfo«r LIm Limi" ST. Lot.'lS PosT·DISPATCIi. 
JUDt 19. WOO, _, B I 
1S7 Id. 
158 ToktfU OWlsidr CasUlO Pr~'~ S4Ifr Audi,or. swpru DOle 54, at CI 
t59 c.-musUJn uts H,/1DIf Off HooI:, nlPra DOte 102, ill C t. 
160 Id 
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charges that it provided financial rewards to fonner Kansas City Pan 
Authority Chairman Eiben Anderson in exchange for his political support for 
the casino,,, [61 The regulatory seriousness of the situation was highlighted 
when the government charged a Hilton senior vice president with three counts 
of fe lony perjury in connection with the investigation. 162 Even so, the 
$500,000 fine was ridiculously low because it equated to just one-half of one 
day's casino revenues. 
During the 1990's, the gambling indusuy's arrogance became readily 
apparent. Several examples demonstrated its belief it could and would receive 
everything it wanted. In some cases casinos uied to cast regulatory 
commissions and licensing qualifications as mere formalities that would 
always provide a rubber stamp of approval For instance, in 2000, Emerald 
Casino Inc. officials apparently violated a rule requiring Illinois Gaming 
Board approval before entering into any construction contracts. 163 Emerald 
approved between $5 million and $10 million for steel and utilities work 
before the Board 's approval " in order to open, , . as quickly as possible."'''' 
Even though it had not yet been licensed, the company apparently felt that 
"each month its opening [was] delayed translate[d J into an estimated $25 
million in lost revenue,',16' Similarly in Missouri, Harrah's advenised a grand 
opening gala for a new riverboat which had not yet been Iicensed. l66 Tom 
Irwin, Executive Director of the Missouri Gaming Commission. complained 
that "[w]e go through this every time," indicating that prospective casinos 
seemingly tried to create public demand to suppon their application for a 
Iicense.167 In Iowa, the required public hearing to renew the lease for Prairie 
Meadows Racelrack and Casino was initially skipped.161 Tom Flynn. Prairie 
Meadows' lawyer said, ''the public hearing and resolution should be a 
formality and cautioned that supervisors could put Prairie Meadows' gambling 
license at risk if they change[dltheir vote."'" Gambling opponents bristled 
161. Id. 
162. Id, 
16). Wort. HailS Aftu SUlIr RtbOltt. sUPrYI. IlOI.t 82, §1. at L 
164. Id. 
]65 . /d. 
]66. Rick A]m and Oscar Avila, Harrah ', Galo invilarum Galls Gaming COIIImission. KAN. CtTy STAA, 
Apr. 27.1996.atC2. 
167. /d. 
168. Frank Bowers, Appro>Vl1 ofua.r~ PrtntO.lUrt: Supuviso,j Skipp"d P"blic Hea,ing an Ca.rino-Track, 
Say OffICials, DEs MOINES REG .. Da::. 6, 1997, a! Ml (MUnda Iowa law. the Joouol)'l supervisors 
Jwael required 10 hold a public huring before approving ill'Iy \case longer man IMet)'UB. Nosuch 
beariog was ile]d before the supervisors leased counl)'-Qwned Prairie Meadows 10 the Racing 
Associ'llion ofCeoll"lllowa."). 
169. Jd. 
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al the implied threats of the casino interests and al the condescending attitude 
of the gambling interests that the required public hearing was a rubber-
stamping formality,,7lI Ln reality, the agreement between the county and (he 
Racing Association at issue "was controversial almost before the ink was 
dry:" " which underscored the need for the hearing and explained why 
gambling interests that could have potentially lost their lease wou ld have 
preferred to avoid the requirement. 
3. Compromising the Opposition: Contributions. Bribes. and Corruption 
Historically . the gambling industry appeared to have unlimited financial 
resources allowing it to vastly outspend its opponents to pursue industry 
agendas. In general. the gambling industry engaged in "'cheerleading' 
publishing by academics and economic consulting fums,.m by sponsoring 
"studies that gave favorable reports of the effects of gambling:,17l 
Similarly, the industry brought multiple test cases in efforts to loosen or 
eli minate restrictions on certain aspects of their operations. For example. in 
Posadas de Puerto Rico \I. Tourism Co .• m the Supreme Coun upheld a ban 
on casino advertising to local residents. The Coun deferred to the judgment 
of the leg islature that the ban would reduce pathological and problem 
gambling among its constituents. In Posadas. the Court recognized the 
advertising ban as legit imate under the Central Hudson test. m It found that 
the "particular kind of commercial speech at issue here, namely. advertising 
of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. concerns a lawful 
activity and is not misleading or fraudu lent, at least in the abstract."176 
Finding that "[pathological] casino gambling among local residents ... would 
produce .. . disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local 
170. Id. 
J71. /d. 
172 &;",,,,,,,ir Losses E..r:al!dGains, supra note 2, 3t9. 
173. Id. at 8. 
174. 478 U.S. 328 ( 1986). 
175. Su Central Hudson Gas & Elee. Corp. \I . Pub. Servo Comm'n of N. Y .• 447 U.s. 557, 566 (1980) 
In eommeroal spuch cases, then a rOut·pan aDalysis bas del'eloped At the Dulsel, 
Id. 
we muS! detcnnme wllcthcr the cxpression is protected by thc Finl Amendment For 
commercial s~eb Ii) come within thaI provision, it al leas t mUSI concern lawful 
aCb"lIY and not be mis leading. NCllt. we ask wbether the assened governmental 
inteK$1 IS substanllal . if botb inquilie5 yield po$itive am;wrn . .... e must determine 
whetbcr the regulatiOQ directly advaoces the go~mmental interest asserted . and 
.... hetbl.'r it IS not more extensive than is necessary to serve thai interest. 
176. Posadas. 478 US al 340--4 1 (empwis added) 
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crime. the fostering of prostitution. the development of corruption, and the 
infiltration of organized crime,,,m the Court determined the advertising ban 
advanced the government's interest'll and was no more restrictive than 
necessary to do SO. 179 A decade later. however. Posadas was all but overruled 
on the commercial speech issue by 44 Uquorman. Inc. v. Rhode Island,llI) 
which noted that "Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was 'up to the 
legislature' to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy, .. l.! 
While Posadas suggested banning advenising to local residents was less 
restrictive than banning the activity allogether,lI2 44 Uquormart simply 
presumed individual citizens could make infonned decisions about the value 
of the advertising statements, IS) The Court 's approach in 44 Liquormart did 
not address how the addictive nature of gambling implied that many 
pathological and problem gamblers were unable 10 assess Ihe value of the 
commercial speech by applying unclouded and rational judgment 
T he Supreme Court also found no illegal restriction of commercial speech 
in upholding a federal statutel'" banning radio stations licensed in non~lotlery 
states from broadcasting lottery advertisements from neighboring states,lSS 
However, where the advertisements were fo r casinos. and targeted solely at 
listeners residing in states where gambling was legal, the statutory ban was 
held to be a violation of commercial speech as applied to (he broadcasters,ll6 
Furthermore . even though the Ninth Circuit recognized that "Congress has 
chosen not to lift the ban on the broadcast advertisement of private casino 
gamb ling," IS7 the court held that the ban violated commercial speech rights of 
broadcasters. even with respect to casino advertising that was broadcast into 
neighboring states where casino gambling was illegal. 11I 
177. Id. al341 
178. Id. 
119. Id. al34J. 
ISO. ~17 U.s . 484 (1996). 
181 . Id. at SOl} For a further COmmtnl reinforcinl il5 dec:ision 10 abmdon deference 10 state Icgislatusa., 
oS« UJ. at 5 10 ("IWje decline 10 give force 10 its hiahly deferential approach.'1. 
182. PruiJdas, 478 U.S. 1I 145-46 ("In our vie ..... the &realer power 10 completely ban casino gamblin, 
necessarily incluoo tbe lesser powcr 10 baD advertisin, of casino pmblin,."). 
183. 44 UqrwmulTf, 517 U.s. &1510 (citiDa Va. 8<1. of Plwmacy v. VI Citizens ConsumerCounciJ, Inc., 
425 U.S. 7.48. at 170.) ("'lilt is preristly lbil kind of choice, belweeR the dan~rs of suppressina 
infonnaliOD. and tbe ~ of ilS misuse if It ii f~ly avail~, tballbe FJI"st Amc:Ddmcnt makes 
for us.''). 
184. Su 18 U.S.C. t 1304 (1993). 
185. Su ItMrall, United States v ~ Bn:-i Co .• SOl} U.S 4 18 (1991) 
116. Grc;aler New Orleans 8J"01d. Ass'D, Inc. v. UDLIed Stain. 527 U.S. 173. 176 (1999). 
187. Vaney Brood. Co. v. Unilcd States. 107 F 3d 1328. ]))0 (9Jh ar 19971, cut. tknitd. 522 U.S 1115 
( 1998). 
las. Id. at 1116. 
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The gambling industry's efforts were even more pointed when pushing 
specific goals: "It [was] nor uncommon for the gambling industry to outspend 
its opponents by overwhelming margins of as much as $100 to $1 in areas 
where the industry wanl[ed] to place new casinos .... lU]nless gambling 
interests outspen[t] those on the Olher side by $75 to $1 or more, voters 
reject[edJ gambling."189 Even when voters did reject gambling, the industry 
pursued other avenues. For example, on various occasions "in Florida, Iowa, 
Missouri. and Michigan, ... public votes (were] taken repeatedly when the 
gambling industry point of view fai1[ed].,,]90 In both the community of 
Waterloo. Iowa and the Slate of Missouri in 1994, the repeated referenda 
occurred within the same year as the previous defeat-separated by only 
approximately four months in Iowa and seven months in Missouri. 191 
Similarly. when twelve of forty-six South Carolina counties voted to ban 
video gambling machines, "operators sued and got the ban ovcrtumed."192 
After the legislature passed a bill re-imposing the ban in those counties. 
industry leaders again threatened suit. 193 FUJ1hermore, the industry 
circumvented "even South Carolina's minimal laws" regarding limits on 
payouts and the number of machines in a location. I!N 
Corruption constituted an especially important issue because it could 
destroy the effectiveness of any existing regulation. With respect to gambling 
regUlation, corruption came from a variety of private interests. such as 
organized crime. '95 Regulatory history revealed that organized crime has a 
deteriorating effect on attempts at effective regulatory structures: "Even the 
best regulatory system [was] undermined by the corrupting influence of 
organized crime ... Money corrupt[ed], and corruption produce(d] more 
money. Once the cycle beg [an]. it [was] difficult to SIOp."'96 Over time. 
patterns emerged: 
189. f:."CMOIII/C Los!ts &;.;cud Gains. Iupra note 2. at 9. Su a/so Follow fh~ Monty. supra note IS. at 88. 
190. Economjc Lo~stl &;.;cud Goins. IUpra note 2, at 9. 
19! Id. 
192 John Hcehinger & John Reinan. Billion-DoHar Vidto P,;k£r hU/UIlry DI>dtt's W'"Il~ 5/",,, LnWJ: 5om~ 
MajQf Ownu~ Hov~ Criminal Ruords, CHARLOTIIl OBSERVER (Charlotte. N.C.). June 8, 1997. 
Special Reprint, at 2 rherein.arter BilliOll-Du/iar VidM PoUr Induslry DadlltS W~a.\: StaU Laws]. 
193. /d. 
194. Id. at 3-
19S. Su Jahoda 1998 Speech in Des Moines. 5upra note 114 (~tatinB Itgali1Zd gambl ing is like "heavm 
on earth" fo.- Drpniud crime). Ap)lifently. corruption was cndemk 10 ccruin state govemrnents as 
wei!: there were "statc! ... when: corruption in government [WI.IJ almosl a given .. .. ~ Su.temenl 
of Robin Farlty. Gaming ATU..I)'SL riltd in Janet Plume, Kuplng Casino.r CMlralled. CASINOJ .• Jan. 
2001. at 84. 86. 
196. BGA IlEf'oMT .lupra noIC 5, at 97. I 
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Organized crime has a propensity to avoid regulations by corrupting public 
officials. especially when gambling is involved. Incidents of corruption and 
confl iet of interest within goverrunent may be more damaging than organized 
crime interests in a casino, because public corruption allow[ed] the Mafia, or 
any other private interest group (such as casino operators), to compromisc 
the public intcrest. 197 
Corruption from private sources with interests in the gambling industry were 
also problematic: 
Non-mob corruption is also an issue with casinos since individuals stand to 
make cnonnOU5 amounts of money with the right "deal." Regarding the 
importance of licensing in Atlantic City to casino operators. New York 
Attorney General Abrams said that legalized casino gambling poses a danger 
to the integrity and credibility of government institutions and public 
officials .ltI ••. Attorney General Abrams found that several federal. state, and 
local officials were involved in influence peddling in licensing dec isions. l911 
. (TJhere has also been a significant display of the "revolving door" 
phenomenon between city enforcement jobs and casino jobs.zoo 
These sources of corruption, if not Icept in check. could potentially destroy any 
attempts to regulate the gambling industry effectively. 
Occasionally, the regulators made inappropriate decisions perhaps due to 
improper influences. These decisions often provoked questions as to the 
motivation of the regulators. For example, in 2000, gambling opponents 
criticized the Missouri Gaming Commission for approving each of three 
separate projects of the Isle of Capri Casino Company within days to week.s 
of its applications. while "[o]ther cas ino companies ha(d1 waited years to get 
licenses."101 Various opponents alleged outside forces influenced the 
commissioners' decisions, and requested the U.S. Attorney's office to 
investigate.2Ol 
Another example came from a 1999 investigation. The Illinois Gaming 
Board approved the sale of the Empress Casino located in Joliet. Ill inois. to 
Jack Binion, despite the conclusion of its own research staff that "Binion has 
a record so fraught with questionable business deals and associations that he 
191. Id. al96. 
198. Id.1198. 
199. Id. aa99 (citin,Allornry Gmt'lll A.broMS NY RtJlOrt. supra note 69). 
200. {d. 
201. Carolyn Tuft. 0pf'l'Mnls ofCoJinD D«uion Dtmond Inwstigation of Gaming Commu.lion. ST. 
LouIs PoST·DISPATCH. July 28, 2000. al A I. 
202. Id. 
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should be barred from operating a casino in Illinois ... %Ill The internal staff 
report further cited "a trail of poor business practices. regulatory violations[.] 
and financial malpractice.,,2001 Despite the internal recommendation to deny 
the sale. the Gaming Board formally approved the sale in late November 
1999.20S Within weeks, the Chicago Tribune reported the staff 
recommendation in a front-page article,· and Illinois Gaming Board 
Chainnan Robert Vickrey resigned under pressure shortly thereafter.201 
Finally, seven months later. the Illinois Gaming Board essentially adopted the 
position of its staff. when it unanimously denied an ownership license to 
Binion for the Empress Casino. lot 
4. Conflict of Interest: Government Benefited as Irs Constituents Were 
Drained 
Conflict of interest is one of the many problems chat develop when 
governmental entitles benefic from legalized gambling actlVllles. 
Governmental regulators supposedly oversee the gambling industry with 
detached neutrality. But when such entities receive and subsequently become 
dependent on a portion of gambling revenues via taxes, these entities 
frequently loose their neutrality. Eventually those governmental entities 
became more concerned about guarding their revenue stream than about 
preventing crime or other social costs associated with pathological and 
problem gambling: "As soon as you get this pannership between government 
and gambling, government becomes addicted to gambling too.,,209 During the 
1990's, the sharpest illustrations of this phenomenon were the California 
cardrooms in general, and the Bicycle Club Cardroom of Bell Gardens in 
particular- in which the federal government controlled a stake and from 
which the city of Bell Gardens obtained "more than 60% of its income from 
20) , Doullu Holt, Casino I'mbt Ignortd, CHI, 1'RlB .. Jan. 4, 2000. § 1, III 1,6. 
204. Id. a16. 
~. Id. 
206. FoJ!be onllDll article, su ui 
201. DoucJas HoIl &. Ray Lonl, Gamillg CllitlQ .. iu Undtr Fir,; R)'CI1l Is F .. notU Owr CasillO Dtol, On. 
TRlB., Jan 7,2{XX).Ii,1ll 1. 
208 Dou,w HoIl, Po~ D«larts 8WOI! UIIjiJ '0 RIUI COUIllO. 00 nuB , July 1,2000.11. al l ; Tammy 
Webber, 8ot:lnl Dt,.,n UC"tlfSt for UUUW o..·tttr· Cltwf O"'·tttr of Rivt~ u. Jolkr luis bun 
NTlUtd ofQ..u11OltDblt 8 .......... ll Prruticts, Sr. J REel (Spn.ll&field, W). July I , 2000, III 1, 9 
209. RobertGoodmu, ("I,ni en Mir.mlb Ewell. Ptufntrs.- Drtu Ciry's SltJU WfiLk,. Efforts 10 RtgllltJit?, 
SAN JOSE MEaCUR y NEWS (SUI Jose, Cal.), Mar. 6, 1997, ill A I [hm:ill.lf\er POrfltt,.,: Do<u CIZy 's 
SUJJ:.t Wtd:t,. £Jforu 10 RtgulaIt?]' Stt gtntroJly Raben Goodman, THE LucK BUSlI'/SSS (1995) I 
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taxes on the [Bicycle Club] casino's operations,,,210 
With respect to the cardrooms in general. 
[Vol. 27 
[c)lub and city interests converge(d) ;n one essential way: the more money 
the clubs ma[deJ. the more money the cit)' ma[de). 
A 13 percent gross-receipts tall on gaming revenue ma[del (Bay 101 and 
Garden City) cardrooms San Jose's second-largest source of business 
taxes-$8.5 million in the [1997] budget year,llI 
When Bay 101 violated a condition placed on its opening that required it to 
send to the city quarterly financial reports conducted by an independent 
accounting firm. ''City Attorney Joan Gallo warned that the potential loss of 
tax revenue to the city 'create[dJ a possible disincentive to strict enforcement 
of the Cardroom Ordinance .... 212 Since the club opened in 1994. "regulatory 
follow-up has been minimal."m Former Garden City club owner Chris Dalis 
commented that "[the taxes were] like an insurance policy for us ... [the city] 
wouldn't want to put us out of business."n. 
In fact, area prosecutors have noted that "San Jose's cardrooms clearly 
violate[dJ state law by charging" a variable fee based on the amount bet. 215 
Also, although players were limited to $200 antes, they could make as many 
as fifteen separate wagers simultaneously per hand of cards at Garden City and 
ten separate simultaneous wagers at Bay 101. 216 One player per table served 
as a banker, "winning or paying off all the [other] bets on the table.',217 Based 
on the number of betting squares per player. bankers at the Garden City club 
"could put up $18,000 to cover their bets;,,211 bankers could risk up to $12,000 
per hand at the Bay 101.219 Bay 101 allegedly stated in its online rules that 
"[tlhere [was] no maximum on banker/player wagers.,mo 
The Bicycle Club in Bell Gardens was a special case demonstrating the 
conniets of interest with the government regulating yet benefiting from 
gambling activities. Even after the federal government seized the club under 
210. Jeffrey R..J.bin. U.s.ltsru.s to Mil iu Share ojCard Club. L.A. TlM£S. Sept 2. 1994. It B I . 
211. Par/llers: Does City's Srau Weaull Effons to Rel~/ale 7, supra DOte: 2011. at A I. 
212. /d.aIAI3. 
213. /d. 
214. Id. 
21S Minnaa Ewell. C(JrdClubs APiHor to S~il'1 Bmilll &I .... SAN JQSE.MEROJRyNE ..... S (San Jose. Cal.). 
Mar. 6, 1991. al AI. A I2-A 13. 
216. M. 
211. Id. 
218, Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
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its asset forfeiture program. "[sJerious crime (was) rampant at the Bicycle 
Club,,,121 The United States owned a controlling 36.2% share in the casino 
until it sold its in terest.222 During the period offedera l involvement. the club's 
head of security, Douglas Sparkes, staled that "{t}he skimming, chealing. 
stealing. and payoffs ha[d] drained the club of much-needed revenues."m He 
testified: 
[T]hc government ha[d] not and w(ould] nOi adopt an active role in 
controlling and eradicating criminal enterprise on the [Bicycle] Club's 
premises for fear of loss of revenue. Indeed government inaction in the face 
of money laundering, skimming and naremics to name a few. translate[d] 
into governmem participation in the criminal activity.ll. 
From the standpoint of law enforcement. the Club [was] seen as a place 
where crime [was] permitted and condoned. The Club hard1 a world-wide 
reputation as the Macau of the West. where it (was ] understood the 
management [would] tolerate almost anything as long as the management. 
(I) profit(edJ from the activity. and (2) [would] continue to profi t from the 
activity.ill 
The federal government "received mi lli ons of dollars in profits from the 
Bicycle Club;"226 some of this money "was spent on political cam paigns 
against competing casino operators ... ·U1 
During the government's involvement in the Bicycle Club. the Justice 
Department found itself investigating alleged cri minal activity in a 
business 11 partially owned .. . The government had to pay its share of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines to the Internal Revenue Service for 
the casino's violation of federal laws aimed at preventing money 
I d · Zl! aun enng. 
After four years. the federal government arranged to sell its share for $37.96 
221. James Bornemcier, u.S.-OWlltd Casino Ovtrrun by CrimI'. Strwnry CMt/ "/11'80, LA TIMES. Mar 
20.1996. at B3. 
222. Id. 
22) . 1'ht N.m ForftilWrr Pro/tram: A. Cast Srudyoftht Birydt Club Casino. Htadn, 8t'fort Iht StIlOft' 
CO""" on Go~·ll1/fair;. 104th Congo 28,18 (1996) (Sl2temcnt and teSlirnony or Dou&las Sparkes. 
Diroctor of Secunly al tbc Belt Gardc:ns Card Dub) [hereina~r Sparkes St,alemenl 10 Bicycle CI\lb 
Hc-arllljl Stt also Bomemeier. supra nolC' 221. at B3. 
224 Sp;ukes Statement to BIcycle Club Hearing. supra nlltC' 223. at 80. 
225. Id. at 26, 77. 
226. Bomemcier, swpra note 22 1. al B9 
227. Id. 
228. Rabin, swpra note 210, at B t 
-
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million in late 1994,z19 
B. Manipulations by Gambling Proponents Inhibited Regulatory 
Effectiveness 
(Vol. 27 
I. Gambling on Indian Lands: Sovereignty Inhibited Functional Regulation 
The Supreme Court decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
IndiansD4 substantially reduced the ability of states to regulate gambling on 
Indian lands. In essence, because California allowed low-stakes bingo games 
for charitable purposes.2lI 1he Court concluded that the lack of a total ban on 
gambling entitled the Cabazon Band 10 run high-stakes games on their 
reservation and not be subject to a California statute making such conduct a 
misdemeanor.132 
After noting California categorized as a misdemeanor the organization of 
bingo games of the type proposed by the Cabazon Band, the majority of the 
Court failed to accept that games operated under those conditions were 
criminalized and therefore subject to California enforcement.23l Instead, 
because California pennitted limited bingo for charity under strict conditions, 
the Court concluded Ihat no violation of public policy occurred when Indian 
groups run bingo games that are nol subject to the strict limits imposed on all 
others in that state.234 The Court also did not address how California's 
restrictions on bingo had the effect of limiting the social costs created by 
pathological and problem gamblers. 235 These elements of control were lost 
when the Court, via its decision in Cabazon, gave Indian groups a special 
entitlement to conduct high~stakes gambling operations otherwise prohibited 
229. Jd. 
230. 4SQ U.S. 202 (1987). 
231. Jd. at 2 11. 
232. Jd. 
233. Idat 209 ("'[ I] f the in\ell\ ofa stau. law [WM) generally 10 prohibil certain COOdUCI, it (fell] wilhio Pub. 
L. 2BO's grant or criminal jurisdiclion, but if the state law generally permil(ed) the conduct at iss.ue, 
$ubjccl 10 regulation, it (was) classified as civiVrcgulatory and Pub, L 280 [did) DOl autlloriz.e its 
eoforttment 011 an Indian reservalionH ). Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat . .588 (1953) (codlned as amended 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (1982 Supp. nm. gave force to state criminal laws and granted state5 jurisdiction to 
enfOftC those criminal laws on Indian lands. ~t § 1162(1.). 
234. CClbav.>tz. 480 U.S. at 210-11 ("California [did] 001 prohibit all forms of pmblio, .... In lipt of 
the fact that California permit[ed] a iubstantial amount of gamblin, activity, including binlo. and 
actually promote[dl gambhng tIlJ"ougll its ~tate Ionery, (the Court concluded] thai California 
rtgulate(dJ rather than prolllbil[ed] gamblin, in eeneral and bin,o in particular:'). 
23.5 . Set g~~rally id. 
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in the Slate of California (and elsewhere). 
The problem with the Cabazon decision is that California did have a 
sufficient stale interest in deciding precisely under which conditions gambling 
CQuid occur, due to the large burden of social costs that uncontrolled gambling 
on Indian lands produced.2.)6 Justice Stevens. in his dissenting opinion, 
elaborated: 
I am entirely unpersuaded by the Courl'sview that the State of California 
hard) no legitimate interest in requiring appellees' gambling business 10 
comply with the same standards thai the operators of olher bingo games [had 
10J observe. The State's interest [was] both economic and protective .... 
Moreover. I am unwilling to dismiss ... the State's concern that these 
unregulated high·stakes bingo games may attract organized criminal 
infiltration . Comprehensive regulation of the commercial gambl ing ventures 
that a State elects to license (was] obviously justified as a prophylactic 
measure even if there [was] no criminal activity associated with casino 
gambling In the State.U1 
The breach in public policy resu lting from the Cabawn decision was 
mitigated somewhat by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
{"IGRA,,).211 In particular. the IGRA superseded the result reached in 
Cabazon.;o9 Yet states had no jurisdiction over enforcement for any ''Class 
lIf' games. uo As defined under the lORA. ''Class rtr' games included 
banking card and slot machine games. whether electronic or otherwise.lAl 
However. the U.S. Anomey General did have authority to seek injunctive 
236. ~t also Uniled Staid v. HIiISI. 951 F.2d 1490. 1498 (6tb Cir 1991) (following Uniled Stales v. 
Dn()U. 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986) rather than t/Ic pllblk policy Ie5I or Cabc:lzcn). 
Hl. (AbG:on, 480 U.S. 31 226-27. (Stevens, J" disse!lting). ' 'The Sta\C's policy contcming gambling 
[was] 10 authorize cenain specific gambl ing activitie$ thll comp\[ied] with carefully defined 
fe,ulation and !hal providc(d] revenue$ ehller for tbe SUIe ilSeif or fot certain chariuble purposes. 
and IpronibilCdj all unn:JUblCd commerciillioucries ~I t"'CfC] operaled (or pnvaIC profiL ~ Id. II 
224. Until prohibllcd byConlP"css. ~a Sute [COIIld] enforce lIS laws pfoll1bHlll1 hi,h·nakes pmbhn, 
on indiao reserv .... ons within ilS borders ... While ,amblln, provllk(d] needed employmeot and 
IIIC:OUJ(' ror todi&n I11bcs. tbcsc bcftefits [did] DOl .. Jusury Inbal optt2l1OD or [OIbcrwIst'j unlawrul 
colMlCfcial activitics" Id at 222. 
238. Ind,:atl GamIn, ReJU1a1or)' Act or 1988. 25 U.S-C. If 2701-2121 
239. $u Uoi~ Stllta v E.c. 1nY1i • 77 F_ld 327. 330 (9th CiT 1996) {appl)'lll' 18 USC. i 1166 (S\lpp 
I99S) (ofllw IGRA] sudl thai Pub. L 280. on whkll!he public policy lest SeI forth ,n C"bo~OII .ehed. 
no longer apphed) 
l4O. ~"S)'CIWI fUnd 0( Minjoa ind,ans v. Roxl'le. 54 F.ld 535 (9th Clf. 1994), rtf''' denud 516 US. 
912(lm). 
241. Su 25 U.S.C § 2703 (2Q{X}). 
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relief against illegal gambling activities occurring on Indian lands,m 
Despite these developments, the lORA did not cure all regulatory failures 
related to gambling on Indian lands. Since Cabazon , the regulation ofIndian 
gambling has deteriorated markedly. By 1996. the National Indian Gaming 
Commission ("NIGC") reported that "84 percent of Indian gambling activities 
were in 'non-compliance'{.l [meaning they] were violating federal regulations 
.... The NIGC was so embarrassed by the results the report's readers were 
left to do the calculations themselves.,,24l 
During the 1990's, other Indian groups also dodged gambling regulations 
in various ways. For example. Santee Sioux members operated a small casino 
in Nebraska without proper authorization. and refused to obey a federal court 
order to close it down.244 Tribal Chainnan Arthur Denny "vowed to go 10 
prison rather than obey [Ihe] court order to close the casino."u~ One tribal 
leader resigned from Ihe Santee Tribal Council; the remaining eleven members 
risked being sentenced to prison .U6 In Arizona. "the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian CommunilY acknowledged it [was] employing felons for [a 
poker] hall. Casino Arizona at Salt River. as a way to help the tribe's 
members:·U1 Upon inquiry. "[tJribal officials [stated] they d[idJn 't know how 
many of the halJ's 350 employees hard] criminal records, having been too busy 
getting the hall ready to bother keeping count.',U8 Arizona appeared to have 
had difficulties establishing the applicability of state laws to the site: ''The 
state want[ed] to regulate reservation poker the same way it ha[d) authority 
under federal law 10 regulate reservation casinos."Z49 Nonetheless. under the 
IGRA, both a poker hall and a casino constituted establishments for "Class 
m" gambling,:OO and were thus subject to federal enforcement of "all stale 
242. &t id.; United Stales v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 13S F.ld SS8. 562 (1998), em. dtnitd 52S U.S 813 
(1998) (also noting, at 56j. tllal for Purposl's of enforccment. uIGRA's inOOl"pOfaliOIl of 'all Stale 
laws' ioclude[dj both sta~ statulor)' and case l.:Iw"); United Stales v. Seminole: Tribe of F1a.. 4S F. 
SlIpp.2d 1330, IBI (M.D. Ra. lm). 
243. Follow tht MOMY, Jupra note 18, at 92 (1998). 
244. Roben Don", CasillO Muy Ua4 10 Jail TtflfU, WQRL[).HERALo(Omalla, Ncb.). Allg. l, 1999,119, 
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241. Indian PoUr Ctuino ill AriwtuJ A.d;lIowl~dgts IlirinK Ftlons, lAs VEGAS REV. J.. JIIIIC 19, 1998. at 
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248. Id. Gary Husk, the State Gaminll Dircru.:.-. commented that "puuinll felons on a payro ll mvite[d] 
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laws.,,2S I In general, situations such as these underscored the need for 
consistent regulation of gambling, including on tribal lands. Ad hoc 
regulation based on the site of lhe operation, the types of gambling activities 
conducted, or any other variables would have invited even more rampant 000 4 
compliance. 
When the state law did not pennit actions desirable to Indian gambling 
interests, they simply obtained a change in the unfavorable statute through 
ex;tensive political lobbying and exorbitant financial contributions. For 
example, ''Califomia'sgambling tribeshaldJ spent about $100 million on state 
campaigns [between 1998 and 2000J, far more than was spent by any other 
imerest in California ... ,2$1 'The Indians hald] bought Sacramento,' said 
Assemblyman Bruce Thompson .... 'They paid good American dollars for 
these votes. They [could] have whatever they want. ."m In this incident. 
which reflected a pauem of the industry in general,H. "[aln Indian tribe made 
wealthy by its casino won swift legislative approval ... to operate a gambling 
cruise ship" between San Diego and Baja. Califomia.l5S This legislation was 
"approved with almost no public discussion .... [It) sailed through the full 
Senate .... The quick action underscore[dJ the gambling tribes' considerable 
political power.,,1$6 This pattern was repeated at the federal level when 
"Democratic Rep. George Miller sponsored a three-sentence amendment that 
was buried in the ISO-page-plus Omnibus Indian Advancement Act [which 
put] a lO-acre parcel (in the San Franciso urban area) into reservation status 
for the Lytton Rancheria band of 220 Indians."1:17 The Indians planned to set 
up acasino with 2000 slO[ machines, capable of "gene rat ling] aquarter-billion 
dollars in revenue annually:,1:18 
In another troubling trend, beginning in the year 2000, more than a dozen 
Indian groups filed lawsuits over ancient land claims in thinly-veiled attempts 
251. United States v. Santee" Sioux Tribe, ]35 F.3d 558 ( 1998); United SIalC$ v Seminole Tribe orRa. . 
45 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.0 . Fla. 1999). 
252. ugi$lalwrt' Qwickly OKr CarifWS. supra noce 48. at A3. 
253. Id. 
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255. ugislaturt' QI<idly OKs ClUm"s. supra note 48, at A3. State law pmhibitl!(\ gambling in Calirornia 
waten; and cruises that sailed 10 international watel'$ 10 permit gambling, 001 !ben ~tumed to port. 
Id. I" this case. h.owever, "state omeial, {had} no authori ty over the casino on.::e il\elft] Ca]ifornia 
waters." /d. 
256. Id. 
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a1A3. 
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to get permission to run land·based casinos.:m Th is trend included the Illinois 
lawsuits claiming 15 counties which were filed by the Miami Tribe of 
Oklahoma, in which the tribe offered (0 seule for a gambling compact about 
the time they filed the suils. l6O In Kansas, the Wyandoue Tribe blatantly 
wanted "two acres next to City Hall in downtown Kansas City deemed a 
reservation so they [could] open a casino."Z61 These land-grabbing schemes 
were audacious. First. the land claims were frivolous, and it was immediately 
clear from the pattern of lawsuits that Indian groups could not be appeased. 
Second. if an Indian group succeeded in its land-grabbing efforts, the state 
lacked jurisdiction under the IGRA to regulate the eventual Indian casino. 
Therefore, because Indian gambling interests have largeted states and 
individual landowners using the pretext of the ancient land claims, new 
protective laws are needed to prevent these costly, frivo lous, and vexatious 
lawsuits.161 
2. Underuported Income 
During its expansion in the 1980's and 1990's, the gambling industry 
fondly listed tax revenues as a benefit to its target communities. Not only was 
the net benefit of these revenues largely or completely wiped out by the 
enormous social costs inherent in gambling, the net benefit was further 
reduced by under-reporting revenue. For example. former South Carolina 
Revenue Commissioner A. Crawford Clarkson Jr. stated that "some operators 
[reported] less than a third of their revenue.":W In early 1995. he estimated 
that $4.4 billion per year flowed through video gambling machines.u.. The 
industry collectively reported only $1.4 billion?6S In 1997. Commissioner 
Burnet Maybank II1 stated that South Carolina had "the most unregUlated 
gambling in America .... The video poker crowd [was] lying like a rug about 
the profitability of the business . .,266 However, enforcement was difficult 
because "[gambling1 operators often intimidate[d] revenue agents tracking the 
illicit cash flow. One auditor found himself facing a shotgun.,,;'61 Such 
2.59. John Kelly, Tri/HII UJnd CLaims Often a &llIle for C4!inos, Sf. J. REG. (Springfield. til.). Jan. 29, 
2001,111-2. 
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situations illustrate how uncontrolled the gambling industry was. 
VI. POLICY ALTERNATlVESANDRECOMMENDATlONS 
The best policy approach from a social we lfare perspective is to simply re-
criminalizeor substantially limit all types of legalized gambling activity at the 
stale and nalional levels. Ahematively, states could set the tax rate on 
gambling operations to between 65% and 90% of all revenue entering the 
gambling operation or device 10 curb the impact from the social costs of 
gambling. Such a tax structure is still generous to the industry when 
compared to the arrangement it accepted in Canada, where the government 
pays a fee to casino management and takes all of the gambling revenues. With 
faster ronns of gambling. such as in casinos and with video gambling devices. 
higher tax rates within the 65 to 90% range are especially necessary to cover 
the enonnous social costs imposed by the new addicted gamblers and the 
accompanying bankruptcy. crime. and corruption problems. Should the 
industry decide not [0 operate under those tax rates, states would enjoy a 
decrease in me net social costs associated with legalized ga mbling in their 
jurisdiction. 
Increased oversight is essential [0 competently enforce existing gambling 
regulations. Loss limits of no more than $500 per gambling session are 
needed in jurisdictions lacking them. Such regulations should require 
gamblers to be present and competent to participate in gambling activities of 
any kind. This encompasses an absolute ban on internet gambling. and helps 
address the impossibility of enforcing regulations through cyberspace. 
Compliance checks must become a routine occurrence at all gambling sites, 
with fines up to 10% or more of the average yearly revenue for that type of 
site-in the millions of dollars at minimum for serious violations. 
Like federal judgeships, gambling regulators need to undergo rigorous 
background checks for ethical conflicts of interest, as well as have safeguards 
which remove political influence from the regulatory process. For example, 
within days of his inauguration in 1999, newly-elected Iowa Governor Tom 
Vilsack targeted three of the five members of the Iowa Racing and Gaming 
Commission ("IRGC') for removal because they had "repeatedly angered the 
gambling industry ... [with} tough regulatory stances."Ui8 Chainnan Brad 
Peyton of the Iowa Commission reported the developments as follows: 
268. Jonathcm Roos & William ?c:tr05Iu. Vi/ra ck Targ~f5 Gamillg PQ11ti. Dt::s MOINES REG., Feb. 10, 1999, 
al A 1 [hereinafter V,l$aclt. TarltrlS Gm",'ns PQlltf]. 
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(Peylon said] he has never queslioned whelher Vilsack can legally remove 
him or any otliercommissioner. SUI Peyton, whoselerm doesn'lcxplre until 
2000. said he refuses 10 quit, and Vilsack will have 10 fire him to get rid of 
him ... , know why this is happening. He is getting incredible pressure (rom 
the gambling lobbyists to get rid of the three troublemakers:' Peyton said,m 
Afler talking with gambling industry lobbyists, Govemor ViJsack declined 10 
meet with members of the IRGC or listen to the viewpoint of the Iowa 
regulators.!''' Apparently. any Commissioner who was actually regulating the 
gambling industry was vulnerable to dismissal for arguably exceeding their 
aUlhority ,171 
Those "troublemakers," Peyton said, include himself and Commissioners 
Harold White, an Estherville Democrat, and Jackie Allen of Lamoni, who is 
politically independent. All three have repeatedly taken stances contrary to 
the wishes of the gambling industry. Their actions have included efforts to 
tightly regulate casino expansions and to restrict gamblers' use of credit and 
casino-customers' access to automated teller machines.71l 
Faced with a large campaign debt, Governor Vilsack was criticized for the 
speed with which he catered 10 a group with deep financial pockets. 273 
Peyton said the gambling industry stands to reap millions of dollars in 
additional profits by having Vilsack fire state regulators who take stances 
against casino expansions. Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino in 
Altoona is suing the Racing and Gaming Commission in Polk County 
District Court in an effort to add 350 slot machines. And Harveys and 
Amerislar riverboat casinos in Council Bluffs have huge expansion projects 
planned.l1' 
Within days Governor Vilsack removed the " three troublemakers" regulating 
the Iowa gambling industry, and by 2002 the gambling industry was 
dominating Iowa's politicallandscape.m 
To address certain issues of corruption, campaign finance refonns are 
necessary to limit unduly large political contributions from gambling interests. 
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Additionally, to so lve the problem of the "revolving door," a mandatory one-
year cooling-off period remains needed for all persons who switch from 
employment as a gamb li ng regulator to employmcm in the gamhling indust!), 
within the same jurisdiction. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The problems of regulating gambling interests and the Iypes of violations 
seemed to be intensifying as the 21st century began. In April. 2001, for 
ex;ample, theSe Louis-based President Casino was fined ;'$107,000 for giving 
illegal campaign contributions to city officials and for not following proper 
slate procedures at the casino,,,276 Also in April, a minuscule $150,000 fine 
settled charges from the Missouri Gaming Commission that the "Harrah's 
North Kansas City Casino and HOlel had received what amounted to cash 
kickbacks,,,117 prompting the press to dub Harrah's "Missouri's Teflon 
gambling company."m At the same time, Missouri's Commission Chair L. 
G. Ullery "instructed staff members to explore seeking a change in state law 
. .. that would permit ... [allowing] ex-felons to work in casinos."m In 
October 2OCI!. the Grand Victoria Casino in Elgin. Illinois. was hit with a 
"$7.2 million fine for [allegedly] doing business with mob-connected finns 
and other troubles."280 President Glenn Schaeffer of the casino's managing 
partner Mandalay Reson Group predicted eventual vindication. 281 However. 
from a regulatory perspective, regulators were troubled by the increasing 
seriousness of the trend in alleged violations, the conflict in interest in 
regulators suggesting potentially allowing ex-felons as casino employees, and 
the increasing ineffectiveness of fines (e.g., $7 million amounting to only a 
few days profits). 
A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that gambling causes 
addiction. bankruptcy, crime. corruption. and all oftbe socia l costs associated 
with those problems. Funhennore, from a strategic or regional perspective. 
the magnitude of the socia l costs far outweigh any potential benefit from tax 
revenues, or from whatever economic development occurs in the immediate 
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financial resources can corrupt public officials. a serious and effective 
regulatory regime became practically impossible to main lain by the end of the 
20th century. An analysis of the historical cycles during which gambling has 
been legalized demonsU1l.tes that the only effective method to regulate 
gambling is to criminalize it via smte constitutional provisions, slate statutes. 
and federal statutes. 
